CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.450
18 February 1970

ENGLISH

GOVT
PUB S
DEP

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 18 February 1970, at 3.0 p.m.

Chairman: Mrs. A. MYRDAL (Sweden)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

70-35288

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. E. HERMANNY
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
	Mr. G.C. ALULA
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. TSUZUKI
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
	Mrs. D. BALJINNYAM
Morocco:	Mr. N. EL FASSI
	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O HOLLIST
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. H. BLIX
	Mr. O. DAHLEN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF Mr. O. SIRRY Mr. Y. RIZK Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Lord CHALFONT Mr. I.F. PORTER Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY Mr. R.W. RENWICK
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD Mr. A.F. NEIDLE Mr. W. GIVAN Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC Mr. M. VUKOVIC
The Secretary-General:	U THANT
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN
Under Secretary-General Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva:	Mr. W. WINSPEARE GUICCIARDI
Assistant Director-General:	Mr. G. PALTHEY

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 450th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. It is a very great honour and privilege for us -- and for me particularly in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee at this meeting -- to greet today the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant. His devotion to world peace is universally acknowledged. His deep interest in disarmament has been manifested many times before. It seems particularly fitting to refer to the chapter on disarmament contained in the Introduction to his last Annual Report to the General Assembly (A/7601/Add.1, paras.26-46). He there illuminated in an admirable way the main issues confronting Member States in the fields of arms regulation and disarmament.

3. Today we have yet another example of this interest of yours, Mr. Secretary-General. You have taken time out of your strenuous and heavy time-table in order to be able personally to address this Committee at a time when we are embarking on a new important phase of our work, the session of 1970, opening up the challenging 1970s -- the Disarmament Decade. I wish to assure you of the appreciation of all delegations of this initiative of yours. I wish also to assure you that we shall all listen with the utmost attention to what you have to say. You are in a unique position to judge and evaluate what the world needs in the way of further agreements to limit and to halt the arms race. We are certain to benefit from your guidance, now as so many times before.

4. I now call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

5. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: First of all I should like to express to you, Madam Chairman, my very sincere thanks for your very kind references to me, and for your gracious introduction.

6. It is a genuine pleasure for me to be present with you today, if only for a very brief time. I had the privilege of addressing you in person in 1962 at the beginning of the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At that time I expressed my conviction that on the constitutional side the Conference was the best equipped one ever to deal with the problem of disarmament; that the institution of the co-Chairmanship provided an effective means for substantive as well as procedural direction for the work; and that the presence of the non-aligned States enabled them to exercise their catalytic and moderating influences in helping to achieve agreement. I am very glad on this occasion to pay tribute to the Eighteen-Nation

Committee on Disarmament and to the success of its endeavours in having produced a number of important agreements in the field of disarmament. I am happy also to welcome the new members of the Committee, whose participation has already contributed to the strengthening of the work and effectiveness of the enlarged Conference.

7. The year 1970 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. It also marks the first year of the Disarmament Decade declared by the United Nations (resolution 2602 E (XXIV); CCD/275). This reconvened session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the first disarmament meeting since the declaration of the General Assembly, provides an appropriate occasion to launch the Disarmament Decade. In view of the importance of this meeting I decided to come in person to address the Conference.

8. The nineteen-sixties saw a number of solid achievements in the field of disarmament. On the eve of that decade, in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty[1/] was signed. In the same year the General Assembly also adopted unanimously the resolution establishing general and complete disarmament under effective international control (resolution 1378 (XIV)) as our goal. In 1961 the Soviet Union and the United States succeeded in working out the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5). The Agreed Principles were welcomed by the General Assembly and recommended by it as the basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (resolution 1660 (XVI)).

9. In 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States agreed at Geneva, in the context of the disarmament discussions on reducing the risk of war by miscalculation or accident, to the establishment of a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/97). In that year too the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed. In the same year the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution (resolution 1884 (XVIII)) banning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from outer space. That ban was expanded and embodied in the outer-space Treaty of 1967 (resolution 2222 (XXI)). In 1967 there was also signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186). In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) was opened for signature.

[1/] United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.402, p.71.

10. All those agreements are noteworthy successes which constitute initial but very important steps towards disarmament. As I noted in the Introduction to my annual report last September (A/7601/Add.1, para.40) there were also, however, some adverse developments during the 1960s. In 1962 world expenditure for military purposes was estimated to total $120,000 million. In 1969 the estimate of total military expenditures had increased to the alarming figure of nearly $200,000 million. This unproductive and wasteful diversion of the world's resources and energy exacted a heavy toll on the living conditions of the peoples of the world in both the developing and the developed countries. I also noted that the world was at a critical crossroads where there was a real danger of a fearful new upward spiral in the "mad momentum" of the nuclear arms race. The issue still hangs in the balance.

11. During the very last months of 1969 several positive events occurred which could be of the greatest significance for the 1970s and give even now some measure of encouragement. The Soviet Union and the United States opened their preliminary bilateral strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki. According to reports they made a hopeful start and agreed that the substantive negotiations should begin in Vienna in April. The General Assembly, conscious of the great importance of these talks, welcomed them and appealed to the Governments of the two Powers to agree as an urgent preliminary measure on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems (resolution 2602 A (XXIV)).

12. Support for the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons received new stimulus at the end of 1969 and at the beginning of 1970 by several important new signatures and ratifications. As a result I feel confident that we can look forward to the entry into force of the Treaty in the very near future.

13. Some progress was made on the question of banning the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and the urgent need to ban their development, production and stockpiling was recognized. Also, for the first time, the nations of the world declared and dedicated a decade for disarmament in a desire to mobilize and organize all efforts for the earliest possible achievement of concrete measures towards general and complete disarmament.

14. The twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly made considerable progress in dealing with the four disarmament items on its agenda. It adopted a record number of twelve resolutions in this field, all of which are before you (CCD/275). The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been charged with a number of urgent and

vital tasks, and the resolutions provide a renewed mandate and framework for your work. With the reconvening of the Conference, which constitutes the greatest and most representative concentration of expertise in the field of disarmament, the opportunity has arrived for concrete and measurable progress in a number of directions.

15. The Conference is seized of four draft treaties or conventions on three questions of major concern: on the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor (CCD/269/Rev.1); on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons (A/7655; ENDC/255); and on banning underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/242).

16. The elaboration and submission to the General Assembly of an agreed draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof would constitute an important step in preventing the danger of the spread of the nuclear arms race to a vast area of our planet. Such a treaty would take its rightful and honoured place with the Antarctic Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the non-proliferation Treaty in reducing the areas of the world and the surrounding environment which are subject to the nuclear threat. I am convinced that with mutual accommodation and compromise it will be possible to reach agreement on a draft treaty for the sea-bed in a relatively short time.

17. Regarding the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, I would like to underline here the General Assembly's invitation to all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of the present year in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (resolution 2603 B (XXIV)). I am hopeful that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will be able to report to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly substantial progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of these horror weapons.

18. It has often been emphasized that there is a relationship between the bilateral negotiations on strategic arms limitation and the question of an underground nuclear test ban. There is, however, room for much useful work by the Conference in exploring and elaborating the provisions of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. I am hopeful that the results of the inquiry I am conducting at the request of the General Assembly in connexion with a world-wide exchange of seismological data (resolution 2604 A (XXIV)) will facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and that the special report

called for by the General Assembly will mark definite major progress towards banning underground tests. In the meantime I would like to re-emphasize the General Assembly's call to all States which have not done so to adhere to the existing partial test-ban Treaty, and its call to all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear-weapon tests in all environments (resolution 2604 B (XXIV)).

19. The General Assembly has requested the Conference to consider for the first time some new problems of a scientific and technological nature concerning radiological methods of warfare (resolution 2602 C (XXIV)) and the possible military applications of laser technology (resolution 2602 D (XXIV)). In recent years some delegations at the General Assembly have drawn attention to the possible military applications of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium, and I myself have become concerned about the implications of this development. I would accordingly venture to suggest that perhaps the time may have arrived for the Conference to consider also this area of technological research and development.

20. Finally, in connexion with the Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly has requested the Conference to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)) Elements of such a programme already exist in the two drafts of treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add. 1-3), in the provisional agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in August 1968, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in September 1968 (A/7277, pp.6-7).

21. It was not, of course, the intention of the General Assembly to delay or postpone the achievement of disarmament agreements to the latter years of the Disarmament Decade. On the contrary, it was the desire of the Members of the United Nations to emphasize the need for early and continuous action, to hasten progress and to maintain and increase the momentum of the achievements of the decade of the 1960s.

22. There are sound reasons for thinking this is indeed possible. The prospects for the early entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty are most encouraging, and I would like to reiterate my appeal to all countries to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date. The hopeful start of the strategic arms limitation

talks may presage progress in this vital field. I believe we can look forward this year to an agreed draft treaty for the denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. There are good possibilities for further ratifications and accessions to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p.117) and for advancing the cause of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Progress can also be made towards facilitating a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban. While I am fully conscious of the difficulties involved in working out a comprehensive programme relating to the Disarmament Decade, I am fully confident that, if members of the Conference apply themselves urgently to this task, they will be able to report an agreed programme to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

23. It has been said that the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks are the most important international negotiations since the Second World War (A/C.1/PV.1691, provisional, p.3). Progress in those talks will undoubtedly have a most important bearing on all of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. I believe that if the two parties could agree, pursuant to the appeal of the General Assembly, to a moratorium on the further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, this would be the single most important first step to prevent the escalation of the nuclear arms race. It would constitute a break-through in disarmament negotiations and would have an immeasurable beneficial effect on all aspects of disarmament and indeed for world peace.

24. It is evident that there is an inevitable interrelationship and interaction among the bilateral talks, the negotiations in the 26-member Conference, and the work of the 126 Members of the General Assembly. My presence at your Conference today is an indication of my belief that the Conference has a most important role to play in the unceasing pursuit of disarmament. But I must reiterate here what I have previously urged, namely that serious attempts should be made to obtain the participation of all the nuclear Powers in all efforts for disarmament. The active co-operation of all of them is essential for a full measure of success.

25. The nations of the world, and particularly those participating in the bilateral talks and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have what may be a unique opportunity in this year 1970 to launch the Disarmament Decade on a successful course and to mark an historic turning-point in the long struggle for international peace and security.

26. **THE CHAIRMAN** (Sweden): Mr. Secretary-General, on behalf of the whole Committee, as well as specifically on behalf of the two co-Chairmen, I wish to thank you warmly both for your having come here to us and for your intervention. We have listened with the utmost care to your remarks. We shall keep them in our minds and in our hearts as we continue our efforts to make this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a meaningful and a successful one. Thank you very much.

27. I now declare the public part of this meeting closed.

The meeting was suspended at 3.34 p.m. and resumed at 3.38 p.m.

28. **The CHAIRMAN** (Sweden): I declare open the private part of our meeting.

29. I am the only speaker inscribed on the list, in my capacity as representative of Sweden.

30. Once again our Committee is taking up its vital task of trying to arrive at meaningful international agreements in the fields of arms regulation and disarmament. Once again world public opinion for a moment has its attention drawn to our existence, and expectations are raised that our work will make at least a dent in the otherwise so unpromising picture of world armaments.

31. The representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and Mexico yesterday indicated the priorities of their respective Governments. Today the Secretary-General of the United Nations has given us very valuable suggestions. These interventions will have to be studied carefully by us all before comments can be made on them in any detail.

32. My intention today is to present in a general way how my delegation sees the Committee's task at this stage, and to try to make some concrete suggestions as to what might be some first steps in the Committee's attack on the problems which are foremost on our agenda.

33. The debate on disarmament at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly was a vivid one and on the whole a very constructive one. It is most important that we do not now lose momentum, all the more since we had in one resolution a particularly challenging call for action, namely the decision, mentioned also by the Secretary-General, contained in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) to declare the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. But if the idea of the Disarmament Decade is to have any real meaning and not in the end be described as empty rhetoric, Member Governments and particularly the members of this Committee must make very earnest, very tenaciously sustained and very well planned efforts.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

34. A first prerequisite is a sharp increase in the productivity of the Committee. Some very useful results have been obtained through efforts in this body in the past, but the rate at which these have been achieved has been slow. Agreements, ready to enter into force, have been few and far between. A much quicker pace is needed if we are to meet the challenge of the 1970s.

35. At the beginning of last year's session we had a useful discussion on procedures. Few changes resulted, however. One new feature, which was used with some success, was the holding of several informal meetings of the whole Committee. We should, in the view of my delegation, definitely maintain the possibility of discussing more freely than is usually the case at the formal meetings both procedural questions and matters of substance. But, of course, informal meetings also should be well prepared. Delegations, working individually or co-operatively, could more frequently submit draft texts or similar working papers to serve as building elements in our attempts to construct new disarmament agreements.

36. Such co-operative efforts have occurred in relation to the item which now seems most ready for immediate action, namely a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.1). True, a number of working documents with suggestions as to changes in and amendments to the draft treaty were submitted as late as in the First Committee of the General Assembly when this item was discussed there. It would seem a waste of time to repeat this same discussion here.

37. I would therefore suggest that a working group, however informal, be created, consisting of the main authors of the draft: that is, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as representatives of all the delegations which submitted working papers in New York. Any other delegation should, however, be free to send representatives to the meetings of the working group and partake of its deliberations. Such a working group would, I suggest, hold informal meetings, the purpose of which would be to arrive at a more definite treaty text, acceptable to all delegations. If this suggestion were adopted, we might devote the formal meetings of the Committee to other subjects in the meantime; and the sea-bed treaty would come before the Committee later when the working group had accomplished its task. We also have to keep in mind that co-ordination will be needed with the Sea-Bed Committee, which is meeting again in March. It seems to me that the whole fate of the sea-bed denuclearization treaty hinges on our coming to a consensus with that other Committee before the two reports go to the General Assembly.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

38. It has often been stated in the past that the working methods of this body were supple and easily adjustable to fit our task. A proof of the soundness of this thesis would, I submit, be the acceptance of the procedure I have just outlined. If it were not adopted, my delegation, like, I suppose, all other delegations, would feel bound to repeat again what we said last year in this Committee as well as in the First Committee of the General Assembly in regard to the sea-bed treaty. Such a repetition could be of no advantage to anybody. It would certainly not further our task of arriving speedily at an agreed text.

39. Turning now to other subjects on the agenda, I would claim that on some of them there exists a similar risk of repetition. The views of my delegation, like those of others, have by now become so well known that it seems almost superfluous to reiterate them. A repetition might even lead to a blunting of the sharp sense of urgency and topicality which the subjects have in themselves.

40. The fact must be recognized that action by the Committee on several important items on its agenda has become somewhat blocked. Little or nothing can be obtained by a sterile re-rendering of past statements. An earnest effort must instead be made by everybody to seek new ways out. This is particularly true of the items which relate to nuclear arms. The comprehensive test ban, the cut-off of fissionable material for weapon purposes, the creation of nuclear-free zones — these are examples of items to which an impressive effort has been devoted in the past but without any new results becoming visible during the last two or three years.

41. And yet two important events, foreseen for the immediate future, could form a useful basis for renewed efforts. I am referring to the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), which might take place — we understand — some time in March, and the second round of SALT (Strategic armament limitation talks), foreseen to start in Vienna on 16 April. Over and over again the obvious connexion between these developments and further progress towards nuclear disarmament has been stressed. The expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States — whose accession to the non-proliferation Treaty has been an important measure of arms control — that the nuclear-weapon States should in their turn enter into meaningful obligations limiting their freedom of action in the field of nuclear weapons have not diminished during the prolonged period of waiting for the start of SALT or the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty.

42. Recent action in the United Nations General Assembly has shown that practically all Member States understand the comprehensive test ban to be the most urgent measure for joint action by this Committee in the nuclear field. Our Committee will have to renew its efforts during this session to arrive at a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation will, for its part, return to this subject in detail at a somewhat later stage. Already today I feel obliged, however, to remind my colleagues of one aspect of the present situation which seems particularly disturbing, namely that of radioactive leakages from underground nuclear explosions. The Yearbook on World Armaments and Disarmament which was published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in November of last year contains some revealing figures in this respect. In a table on page 250 twenty-nine underground nuclear tests are listed which are reported to have "vented", thus having resulted in measurable atmospheric radioactivity. Of these, nineteen have occurred since the signing of the Moscow Treaty in 1963. In some of the tests which vented, the detectable amounts of radioactivity passed outside the nuclear-weapon country concerned. These constitute violations of the Moscow Treaty, which contains -- as is well known -- the prohibition of all nuclear explosions in any environment -

> "... if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted." (ENDC/100/Rev.1, article I)

43. In connexion with that risk of radioactive debris not being contained within national borders, the preparations of the main nuclear-weapon Powers for megaton shots on island sites are particularly disturbing. The risks of venting must be considerable, and the spreading of radioactive fall-out outside national borders in such an event almost inevitable.

44. Several statements have been made here in the past drawing attention to this problem. A significant one is that contained in the Joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty submitted to this Committee by its then eight non-aligned members in August 1968:

> "There have also been reports that large underground tests have led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus causing infringements of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Even if these incidents have not been deliberate, they may eventually lead to a weakening of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and even endanger its very existence." (ENDC/235, p.2)

Clearly any trend towards erosion of the Moscow Treaty must be stopped.

45. Connected with this whole issue, and also with the non-proliferation Treaty, is another important task which has increased in urgency. I am thinking of the international agreement or agreements foreseen in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty and intended to deal in further detail with the possible utilization by all States of the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The technical aspects of this question are being dealt with within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as bilaterally in talks between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. This Committee will need to be informed in a broad manner of these developments, and I should like to ask the Secretariat and the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States to keep this wish in mind. More important, however, is the need for some action within our Committee on a policy problem: the content of an independent international instrument which would contain the rules for a non-discriminatory access by all States to the technology of nuclear explosions and a regulation of the utilization by any State of such nuclear explosions.

46. I suggest that it is high time that we start again a serious discussion on this matter. Someone might say that this is primarily a task for the IAEA, seized as it is with the technical aspects of the matter. In response I may, however, remind my fellow delegates of the wording of the resolution relating to nuclear explosions which was adopted at the last session of the General Assembly. In resolution 2605 B (XXIV) a well-deserved tribute is paid to the IAEA for its work in the technical field, and the Agency is asked to continue that work and to report on the progress of its further studies and activities to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 1 October 1970. In a separate paragraph of the operative part of the resolution the Assembly notes, however,

> "... that the nature and contents of the special international agreement or agreements to be concluded pursuant to the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will remain open for appropriate consideration and will be the subject of further consultations" (para. 7)

This consideration and these consultations could, in our opinion, most usefully be initiated in this body, which was the one responsible for the elaboration of the original draft treaty on non-proliferation. They would also fit in well with our further considerations of the vital test-ban issue.

47. It might prove useful to conduct some informal group discussions also on this subject in order to work out some principles on which agreement could be sought and even, at a later stage, common draft treaty texts. Some such procedure would save time and therefore be more conducive to results at this session.

48. I should like to say a few words also about nuclear-free zones and other regional disarmament measures. The whole world has noted with admiration the successful achievement of the nuclear-free zone in Latin America (ENDC/186). This development should encourage States of other regions to take similar action. In these most recent months we have witnessed some signs of a new interest in mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe. If a dialogue on arms-control measures could be initiated, and continued, between the two military blocs in Europe, the possibilities of renewing past efforts to create within this continent a nuclear-free and/or otherwise regulated zone of arms limitation, or several such zones, would be increased. The neutral nations could then proceed to strengthen such arrangements by adhering to them if circumstances were suitable.

49. So far I have dealt with matters on our heavy agenda which might, in the view of my delegation, preferably be dealt with initially in informal working groups, so as to lay a better groundwork for definitive action. That leads naturally to the question, what should the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament then deal with in the formal meetings in the meantime? The answer is quite simple: it should take up either matters which seem ripe for action now or those on which we have to grope for a new approach. If the work of conciliation and compromise which I have mentioned as being needed in order to arrive at a generally-acceptable limited sea-bed treaty were to be rapidly successful, that item would of course come up in the Committee very soon.

50. The most obvious item for immediate concern is the issue of chemical and biological weapons. The Committee is faced with a clear mandate from the General Assembly to "give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibitions and other measures referred to in the draft conventions" (resolution 2603 B (XXIV)) which are already before it and other relevant proposals made during the United Nations debate. The Committee has also been requested "to submit a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session". (ibid.)

51. For several reasons this might be called our most urgent task. In the first place there is a new and spreading awareness of the threats which chemical and biological warfare poses to mankind, which has led governments to look anew at their policies in this field. A desire to reach further limitative international agreements has been clearly demonstrated, and the possibilities of positive results in any such endeavours therefore seem brighter now than earlier. The urgent need to curb the present arms race in this field need hardly be elaborated further. We also have available to us the report of the Secretary-General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (A/7575). Its conclusions are clear and have been quoted many times both in this Committee and in the recent United Nations debate.

52. The SIPRI Yearbook, to which I referred earlier, also contains an interesting chapter on chemical and biological warfare. In this field, as in so many others, the information available to us is mostly about United States programmes. The only reason for this is, of course, that the United States is less secretive about its arsenal and development programmes than other major Powers. It is well known, mainly from outside sources, that these latter are carrying on similar work. SIPRI is now completing a separate study on this subject to be called "Chemical and Biological Warfare — Developments, Dangers and Disarmament Possibilities". I have been informed that a preliminary version of that study will be made available to representatives here in the very near future. As considerable work by several experts has been devoted to the study, it ought to provide us with some further good background material.

53. As the ban against the use of those weapons, as contained in the Geneva Protocol (A/7575, p. 117), was confirmed once again by the last session of the General Assembly, we can now proceed from there and concentrate on the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling. The problems here are indeed formidable. I believe that we must now embark on a kind of new mapping expedition, using our formal sessions in the beginning to consider all possible approaches. True, we possess two draft conventions that have already been submitted, one on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/255/Rev.1), and the other on the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and eight other delegations to the United Nations General Assembly (A/7655). But before we enter into a detailed discussion of them we might take a good look around hoping to find further promising approaches or combinations. We should

then also give attention to the problems connected with verification which might well turn out to be the most difficult.

54. This is, as we all know, the case with a number of arms-control and disarmament items. Consideration of several items simultaneously might be profitable if an exercise were undertaken with the goal of trying to arrive at more uniform conceptions as to the treatment of international verification problems. Personally, I am strongly convinced that this is an area where fresh thoughts and a free discussion might turn some particularly important keys.

55. I am bold enough to think the same about still another subject which delegations have earlier hesitated to tackle because of its particularly difficult and sensitive nature. I am hinting at the serious problems connected with the trade in arms. I am not ready at this stage to propose any specific manner in which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might tackle such a subject, still less to suggest any solutions. I only wanted to mention this item today as part of the general area which we cannot escape discussing if we are to strive in earnest towards the ultimate goal of our work -- general and complete disarmament.

56. It is a sad fact that military expenditures are generally rising the world over and that this has been accelerating recently. To an important extent the arms trade takes the form of proliferation of costly, sophisticated weapons. Competition by the supplier countries is furthermore often increased by a desire to seek political influence among the customers. A beginning towards restriction of the arms race, however, calls for regional considerations and soundings; but some of the general characters of the problems could well be aired in our body. The unbalanced arms race and the unbalanced arms trade are problems with which we must finally come to grips, because we have been asked by the General Assembly --

> "... to work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (resolution 2602 E (XXIV))

57. Our goals are set very high, and not much time is allotted to the world if it proceeds on its present course. Our task is to arrive quicker than hitherto at tangible results on specific measures. The Committee cannot afford to let this year go by without being able to show to the rest of the world some hopeful signs that man can become master of his death-machines.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 450th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by the Chairman.

"After conclusion of the open part of the meeting a statement was made by the representative of Sweden.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.451
19 February 1970
ENGLISH

GOVT
PUB
DEPT

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

GE.70-3524
70-35291

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. E. HERMANNY
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. TSUZUKI
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
	Mr. M.H. NASSAR
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. O. DAHLEN
	Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Lord CHALFONT
	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.W. RENWICK
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. **The CHAIRMAN** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 451st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. **Lord CHALFONT** (United Kingdom): May I begin, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you and other representatives who were kind enough to welcome me back in Geneva at our opening meeting on Tuesday? It gives me very great pleasure to be back here; and I should like, in turn, to welcome those representatives who are taking part in our deliberations for the first time -- the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Guerreiro; the representative of Japan, Ambassador Abe; the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdenbileg; the representative of Poland, Ambassador Natorf, and the representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu. For other reasons I am delighted to see many old friends around the table, and perhaps the others of them will not mind if I single out especially Mr. William Epstein, who in this particular session is acting as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in our Committee.

3. We are beginning a session in which I believe there are real possibilities for progress in disarmament and arms control. In saying that I have especially in mind the words addressed to us yesterday by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We all appreciate the fact that he decided to mark the start of the Disarmament Decade and the enlargement of our Committee on Disarmament by coming here to speak to us; and like all my colleagues here I listened with great attention to his words of exhortation and encouragement yesterday. It is right that we should be reminded in this signal way of our responsibilities; and let me say at once that we acknowledge these responsibilities and we shall respond, as I hope we have responded in the past, to the Secretary-General's appeal. We welcome the spirit which he evoked for the Disarmament Decade.

4. We represent here today a group of sovereign States. Although as a Committee we receive many helpful expressions of world opinion, including, of course, resolutions from the United Nations in New York, there is no one who can tell us how to control the powers and potentialities which are constantly being made available from scientific discovery. It is difficult, and indeed might even be dangerous, to try to put limitations on the scope of scientific investigation or to try to prevent the development of new discoveries, even though some of them may have a terrible potential for destruction.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

5. It is, however, for us in this Committee to define the rules and the restraints which will ensure that scientific advances are used for the benefit and not for the destruction of mankind. The first and most obvious example that springs to the mind is, of course, the power of the atom; but it is no longer alone. Developments in microbiology and chemistry which offer great benefits to mankind might also lead to the emergence of new and appalling weapons of mass destruction. And, of course, there are new environments opening up in space and, for example, in the Antarctic and in the ocean depths. We here in the Committee on Disarmament must formulate and exercise our own restraints; and it is a task which calls for a special kind of diplomacy with a practical and compelling aim. I am glad that the Secretary-General reminded us of the world-wide expectations which wait upon our deliberations, and I should like to state formally at this stage that Britain for her part will do all she can to make this Decade an outstanding one in the cause of arms control and disarmament.

6. In saying this I do not underestimate the size of the task we are setting ourselves. During the last decade we achieved the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). Elsewhere contributing greatly to this climate of restraint and progress in arms control, we had the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186) in which the representative of Mexico played such a notable part. These are all fine achievements, and I for one am proud, as I imagine many others round this table are, to have been associated with them. Yet even more is going to be expected of us during the 1970s. To fulfil those expectations we must tackle the really difficult problems, we must try to crack the hard nuts; but while doing so I feel that we must not fail to seize every opportunity as it occurs, however marginal it may appear at first in the context of a wide aim such as general and complete disarmament. The sum total of what one might describe as secondary arms-control measures represents substantial progress towards this final goal.

7. Before I address myself to the work that lies before the Committee I should like to say a word about the national approach to arms and armed forces. We have heard a great deal about the vast sums of money that are being spent about the world on armaments and on armed forces, and I think it is perhaps worth pointing out to my colleagues the efforts that the British Government has made in recent years and is continuing to make

to reduce the level of expenditure on defence in the United Kingdom. Currently the defence budget of my country is, at constant prices, about 12½ per cent lower than it was in 1964/65. As a proportion of our gross national product, which is a figure we have heard mentioned in other contexts, the defence budget has declined from a figure of 7 per cent, which was being planned back in 1964, to about 5 3/4 per cent at the present time. Moreover, the share of the total public expenditure going to defence has declined very significantly.

8. Obviously, limitations of national defence expenditure are a step in the right direction. They enable more of our national resources to be used on education, social welfare and so on. But they are, in my view, no substitute for measures of arms control and disarmament embodied in legal instruments with an international application.

9. The pattern of the 1970s is still far from clear, but we start this decade with what are undoubtedly the most important arms-control talks that have occurred since the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was set up. I am talking, of course, about the strategic arms limitation talks which are shortly to be resumed in Vienna between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those talks, although they are not taking place here, might well result in the most important advance in arms control of this decade. The problems under discussion between the Americans and Russians are, of course, by their very nature best dealt with bilaterally, and I recognize that the responsibility of the two participating Governments is primarily to their own people. However, I am sure they realize that they have a responsibility also to the whole world to do everything in their power to make the talks a success.

10. But it should not be forgotten that there are other aspects of arms control and disarmament which are better dealt with multilaterally; and we must make it clear that this Conference is, as Mr. Smith, the United States representative, said the other day: "the world's principal forum for multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament." (CCD/PV.449, para. 12). This is particularly true now that we have an enlarged and strengthened Committee. This Committee does not deal only with ancillary or subordinate matters: we have important and urgent work to do here. Just as the strategic arms limitation talks will, we hope, help to strengthen confidence between the two super-Powers, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament too confidence can be built up between different parts of the world, and the tensions that are the underlying cause of armed conflict can be eased.

11. Indeed, the strategic arms limitation talks themselves are an example of this. I have always considered that the success of the non-proliferation Treaty which we negotiated here depended to a large extent on the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty, which called for further measures of disarmament. The opening of the strategic arms limitation talks is, in my view, a most important step in that direction. We now look forward to the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty early next month; and we also welcome the opening of talks on safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency board meeting this month. If we can get early agreement on procedures for the application of the safeguards required by article III, we shall have made a really concrete advance. These are all important developments, and I hope they will encourage those who are still making up their minds about signing or ratifying the non-proliferation Treaty.

12. Looking forward to the first year of the Disarmament Decade and to our work at this session, we in this delegation still consider a comprehensive test ban as one of our highest priorities. We have made proposals on that subject (ENDC/232) which remain on the table here; and it is also still our hope that all States will co-operate to the full in meeting the Secretary-General's request for information on the seismic data which can be exchanged internationally. We should like to see early progress on the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions, and we welcome the reopening of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on that subject last week in Moscow.

13. In his speech yesterday the Secretary-General suggested an addition to our agenda, saying that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might perhaps consider the possible military applications of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium (CCD/PV.450, para. 19). As the Conference will know, that subject is of special interest to my Government, as the United Kingdom, together with the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, has negotiated an agreement to collaborate in the development and exploitation of this process. We hope that this agreement will be signed very soon.

14. We all know that this process can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons, but it is not unique in that: a nuclear reactor can be used for that purpose also. That is why we all attach such importance to the non-proliferation Treaty and to the negotiation by States which are parties to it of agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the effective verification of their obligation under the Treaty.

My view is that the right place to discuss safeguards is Vienna, and I fear that it might be an unwise precedent for this Conference to discuss one particular aspect of nuclear technology in isolation. Perhaps I might add that the three Governments — my own and the Governments of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany — believe that their collaboration in this field will make a substantial contribution not only to the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy but also to the cause of non-proliferation. International collaboration on the process in itself makes it unlikely that it could be used in such a way as to encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

15. Perhaps I might now take up a point made by my colleague, Mr. Smith, in his statement on Tuesday (CCD/PV.449, paras. 35, 36) and then again by Mrs. Myrdal yesterday (CCD/PV.450, paras. 55, 56), when they referred to the urgent need to consider the problems of conventional arms, and say that the British Government also is ready to work with all countries to encourage international agreement on regional arms limitations. We would welcome international agreement on effective measures to control the arms trade, and for some time we have been studying the problems involved and the best way to make progress. In our view the primary requirement for the implementation of an effective international agreement is the active support of all the major supplying countries; although, of course, the attitude of recipient countries is a key factor as well. Although experience in the past has shown us that an effective agreement on the arms trade may be very difficult to reach, I hope that this problem will not be neglected during this coming decade.

16. I should also like to say a few brief words about the sea-bed treaty. We have before us the text of the draft treaty presented by the co-Chairmen on 30 October last (CCD/269/Rev.1), together with several proposals, including some made by my own delegation. In fact I believe we now have the ingredients necessary to complete our work, and it is my hope that we shall be able to reach agreement on a final text before the end of the present session. I do not wish today to go into the details of our own views, but I should like to remind my colleagues of my proposals of 21 October 1969 in Geneva (CCD/PV.444, paras. 68-79) and of 19 November 1969 in New York (A/C.1/PV.1694, provisional, pp.23 et seq.).

17. The second main subject of importance which we have before us in the form of concrete proposals is that of chemical and biological warfare, and I should like to think that here, too, we can make real progress during the first year of the Disarmament

Decade. In spite of the General Assembly resolution of December 1966 (2162 B (XXI); ENDC/185), I think it is true to say that there was comparatively little interest in this particular field of arms control at that time; but the Secretary-General referred to it during an earlier visit to Geneva in 1968, and a few days later the United Kingdom Government put forward certain proposals in this Committee (ENDC/231*). This led to the suggestion that the Secretary-General should be asked to prepare an experts' report on chemical and biological weapons and the effects of their possible use; and this most valuable report (A/7575), published at the beginning of July 1969, has undoubtedly had the effect of focusing attention on chemical and biological warfare here, in the United Nations and in the world at large.

18. The United Kingdom has given most serious consideration to the problems connected with chemical and biological warfare. As the Committee knows, we have concluded that the most promising way of making early progress is to work for a separate agreement providing for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare and the destruction of biological agents and ancillary equipment. Even so, it was not easy to formulate the provisions of a possible international agreement; and we have been much encouraged by the compliments of some of my colleagues on the draft convention which we eventually presented to the Committee (ENDC/255/Rev.1). I know, however, -- this became very clear both here and in New York -- that it is the wish of many members of this Committee to discuss the prospects of progress on chemical and biological warfare together; and I said in the United Nations that we were ready to fall in with the wish of the majority. I hope that the considerable expertise that we have acquired in this field as a result of our special studies over the last two years will be of use to the Committee. It will certainly be at their disposal.

19. A most important development in this field which I have already welcomed elsewhere is, of course, the decision of the President of the United States to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575, p. 117) to Congress for ratification, to renounce unilaterally the possession of biological weapons and to destroy stockpiles of those weapons. I warmly welcome this imaginative and courageous step, which constitutes a positive act of disarmament -- the actual destruction of weapons of war. It is an act of the kind which we are all working to achieve, and one which, in the field of biological weapons, our draft convention would provide for under international agreement. I

hope that the example that has been set will be followed by other governments and that it will give impetus to our efforts to add an important measure of arms control and disarmament to the achievements of this Committee.

20. Finally, I should like to say a few words about the answer given in the United Kingdom Parliament by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 2 February on the scope of the Geneva Protocol as regards the use of tear gas in war. If any members of the Committee would like to have copies of the actual answer which he gave in Parliament, my delegation can provide these. What Mr. Stewart did was to reaffirm the British Government's position as stated in 1930 that "tear gases and shells producing poisonous fumes are ... prohibited under the Protocol". But he went on to say that modern technology has developed CS smoke which, unlike the tear gases available in the 1930s, is not considered to be significantly harmful to man in other than wholly exceptional circumstances and that, accordingly, we regard CS and other such gases as being outside the scope of the Geneva Protocol.

21. We gave long and detailed consideration to this matter in view of the very wide interest which was displayed at the last summer session of this Committee as regards the scope of the Geneva Protocol. The use of such substances as CS, if British troops were ever called upon to use them in war, would provide opportunities to save lives and not to kill, particularly when innocent civilians may be involved. They would not, so far as we are concerned, be used in a manner inconsistent with the generally-accepted rules of war. It would be shortsighted, in our view, to deny armed forces the use in war of perhaps the only non-lethal weapon in their armoury and thus to compel the use in certain circumstances of more drastic measures. Now I know that the use of tear gas is at present very much in the minds of everyone concerned with arms control and disarmament; but I believe that the Committee would be doing itself a disservice if it devoted time and attention to seeking to outlaw a substance like CS at the expense of concentrating on the whole range of lethal weapons of war in national arsenals.

22. I have not put forward today any specific proposals on the matters which are currently before the Committee, but I look forward to doing so at a later date. I have been mainly concerned to speak in support of the message of encouragement given to us yesterday by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. His presence here marked the beginning of the world's first Disarmament Decade, and it is now our task to see that we live up to the high expectations that have been raised.

23. **Mr. ESCHAUZIER** (Netherlands): I would like to seize this opportunity to put on record that I associate myself entirely with the remarks of Lord Chalfont on the question of the production of enriched uranium by the method of ultra-centrifuge. I also wish to assert that the tripartite efforts of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands to seek new methods of enriching uranium have been prompted to a large extent by the desire to guard against a possible shortage in the future of enriched uranium if and when the need for enriched uranium for peaceful uses in reactors becomes more pressing.

24. To the extent to which the facilities connected with the ultra-centrifuge process will be located on the territory of the Euratom countries -- in other words, in the Netherlands -- they will be covered by the Euratom safeguards system; and it goes without saying that in due course they will also be subject to verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency under article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*).

25. Once again, therefore, I want to say that I fully share the opinion of Lord Chalfont -- and in parenthesis I wish to say that I fully respect and understand the concern of the Secretary-General in this respect -- that this subject is simply a matter of safeguards arising under the non-proliferation Treaty, and that for the moment I do not see any need to discuss this problem in our Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 451st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 24 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.5 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.452
24 February 1970

ENGLISH

GOV
PUB
DEPT

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. H. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

70-35294

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO Mr. L.F. LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF Mr. R.W. CLARK Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES Mr. J. PETRAN Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN Mr. N. KRISHNAN Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO Mr. F.L. OTTIERI Mr. R. BORSARELLI Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. TSUZUKI
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
	Mr. M.H. NASSAR
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN
	Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF Mr. O. SIRRY Mr. Y. RIZK Mr. M.S. DRAZ
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD Mr. A.F. NEIDLE Mr. W. GIVAN Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. **The CHAIRMAN** (United Arab Republic): I declare open the 452nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. **Mr. NATORF** (Poland): At the outset I should like to express my appreciation to all representatives who have kindly welcomed me as the leader of the Polish delegation in this extremely important Committee. I am very happy to note that a large number of representatives seated around this table are old acquaintances of mine with whom I have already had the pleasure of working in different organs of the United Nations. Therefore I need not repeat how happy I shall be to co-operate with all representatives in the fulfilment of the tasks before this Committee.

3. I should like to express the strong belief of the Polish delegation that we are beginning a session in which substantial progress will be made in the field of disarmament. In stating this, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the hopes enunciated in this room last week by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CCD/PV.450, para. 22). Knowing his overloaded time-table, we deeply appreciate the fact that he decided to underline the responsibilities of our Committee by coming here to speak to us. Let me then again express the hope that we shall all intensify our work in response to the Secretary-General's appeal, so that in this first year of the Disarmament Decade we shall be able to report to the General Assembly on disarmament solutions arrived at in the course of this session.

4. When we mention a new decade our thoughts automatically turn to the previous one in order to evaluate whether the work of this Committee has given the expected results. Although our ultimate goal — general and complete disarmament — remains far away, we must always keep it in mind. We realize by now that what has been achieved so far is only a beginning. We also know that we are not going to achieve general and complete disarmament in a year or two. We know that while we continue to search for it we must take steps that will make this world a less dangerous place to live in.

5. The decade we have just left saw a number of important achievements in the field of disarmament. Of all the agreements arrived at in the field of our Committee's responsibility, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) is by far the most important. Poland, as one of the active constructors of the non-proliferation Treaty, considers it a focal instrument for attaining an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. We consider the Treaty as an

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

instrument which offers the best attainable framework we are likely to have for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and at the same time giving an impetus to a cessation of the nuclear arms race and opening the way to nuclear disarmament.

6. It is obvious that the Polish Government, which signed the non-proliferation Treaty on the first day that document was opened for signature and ratified it in the spring of 1969, welcomed the decision on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to meet for the strategic arms limitation talks as the most important outcome of the non-proliferation Treaty and the most responsible beginning of the implementation of its article VI. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the positive outcome of those discussions will affect the international situation as a whole and the future of disarmament negotiations. In this respect, too, we fully share the view expressed in this Committee by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 February (CCD/PV.450, paras. 23, 24).

7. Moving now to the technological field, I should like to draw the attention of this Committee to the fact that in the near future plutonium, one of the basic ingredients of nuclear weapons, will become a common industrial product as the result of the development of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The presence of vast amounts of fissionable material in many countries will, if uncontrolled -- and I stress the words "if uncontrolled" -- create a serious potential threat to international security and could easily defeat the whole purpose of the non-proliferation effort.

8. In our opinion, a similar danger resides also in the possible military applications of products obtained from the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium, if not adequately safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As we all know, this process can be used to produce nuclear-weapon grade uranium. The Conference is well aware of the fact that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic are negotiating an agreement to collaborate in the development and exploitation of this process. On several occasions we have paid tribute to the United Kingdom for its contribution to the preparation of and the support it has given to the non-proliferation Treaty. The same is true in the case of the Netherlands. Unfortunately we cannot pass the same judgement on the third State party to this project.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

9. In addition, we fail to understand the relative haste in the implementation of this project, especially in the light of the decision of the thirteenth General Conference of the IAEA, where the question of a fund of special fissionable materials was considered and some member States of the Agency, producers of such material, indicated their willingness to consider making further contributions to the already existing fund when it became necessary. We realize that the IAEA in Vienna is the proper place to negotiate safeguard arrangements under the provision of article III of the non-proliferation Treaty. Poland will do so, in accordance with the obligations resulting from its ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty, after its entry into force. In the meantime, we regret to note that not a single EURATOM country has yet ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. I need not say that the Polish Government would welcome an early ratification of the Treaty by all the western-European Powers as well as the early conclusion of an agreement with the IAEA on the question of safeguards.

10. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty and adherence to it by all European States would create conditions conducive to a further search for regional measures of disarmament most appropriate for Europe. Poland, as is well known, has always attached considerable importance to such regional measures. The acceptance and implementation of concepts such as the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone and the plan for freezing nuclear armament in Europe would lead to the slowing-down of the arms race in general. If in recalling those plans we take the liberty of recalling also that as early as 1964 Poland made a proposal for the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation (ENDC/C.1/1), we simply want to underline the fact that all those concepts have retained their timeliness, and we do so in order to stress even more strongly that medium and small States can make their own constructive contribution to the shaping of international relations.

11. Speaking of regional solutions, the Polish delegation wishes to underline that the political and economic elements bearing on the arms race have been highlighted in the Warsaw Treaty Powers' initiative, formulated in Budapest, concerning the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation. The most urgent task ahead of us is to create conditions in which no dispute can constitute an imminent threat to the peaceful existence of European nations. Everyone realizes that the building of a peaceful Europe must, of course, proceed gradually. In the first place we must undertake a set of measures of both a political and a military nature which could reduce to a minimum the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict and reinforce the badly-needed sense of security.

12. The question that needs to be answered therefore is the following: what are the specific issues which the countries of both eastern and western Europe could and should solve as their contribution to European security? It goes without saying that the recognition of the existing frontiers in Europe would help to further the process of normalization in Europe, since the repudiation of claims aimed at undermining the present territorial and political conformation established as a result of the Second World War is a matter of crucial importance.

13. Agreements on problems which I have just mentioned would bring nearer the creation of a system in which the existence of military alliances ensuring their members a sense of relative security would be replaced by an all-European system of collective security. It was with this end in mind that Poland and other socialist countries, following the decisions of the Conference at Karlovy Vary in 1967, proposed the drafting of a treaty renouncing the use of force, to be concluded by all European States including the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. The renunciation of the use or threat of force could be followed by measures aimed at checking and reversing the nuclear arms race in Europe. That is why we consider the proposals on this subject as remaining fully relevant to the requirements of the present situation.

14. I have dealt at length with the problem of European security and regional measures of disarmament, not only because Poland is a European country and is vitally interested in the stability of peace and the establishment of a fool-proof system of security in this continent, but because events in Europe have a tremendous impact on world developments, particularly in the field of disarmament.

15. Turning now to other subjects on our agenda, I would like to say a few words about the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare. In the view of the Polish delegation this question is the major issue of our disarmament debate at this session. I need hardly underline the fact that those weapons are among the most inhuman means of warfare. They afflict both military forces and civilian populations; they have a deadly effect on the human environment; they are capable of upsetting the ecological balance of nature; and if used in armed conflict their consequences might be felt for generations.

16. The realities of the dangers were vividly called to our attention in the excellent report prepared by the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575). The twenty-fourth session of

the General Assembly was unanimous in recognizing that this study has contributed greatly to the world's awareness of the disastrous results that would follow if those weapons were ever to be used. My delegation is gratified that this work has been undertaken as a result of a Polish initiative formulated in this Committee (ENDC/PV.385, para. 70). Our further efforts should be directed at two objectives: in the first place, the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p. 117) by obtaining its universal acceptance; and secondly, the elaboration of additional and stronger agreements ensuring the eventual elimination of all chemical and bacteriological weapons from our planet.

17. Following the initiative of the delegation of Hungary at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly which resulted in the adoption of resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185), Poland has given the most serious consideration to all aspects of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological warfare. That is why, as a follow-up of the recommendations contained in the Foreword to the Secretary-General's report (A/7575, p. xxi), we, together with other socialist States, submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655). We are glad to note that this initiative met with general support at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

18. We have also taken note that a number of delegations, while supporting the content of the draft treaty I have just mentioned, expressed the opinion that a safeguard clause would strengthen the main provisions of this document. I am glad to inform the Conference that a group of Polish experts have prepared a proposal dealing with this problem, and after consultation with the other sponsors of the draft treaty we will introduce it during our discussion when we tackle the substance of the problem. We are confident that the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as understood in resolution 2603 A and B (XXIV) (CCD/275), will be given top priority in our debate.

19. Another important and urgent task confronting the Committee on Disarmament is to finalize the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. The lively discussion held on this question at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly revealed the great importance attached to it by the

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

vast majority of nations. We are happy to note that the majority of speakers in the First Committee of the General Assembly, when discussing the draft treaty dated 30 October 1969 and submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and the United States (CCD/269/Rev.1), welcomed the third preambular paragraph, containing a pledge by the parties to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race. It was welcomed as a sign of the determination of the parties to extend at a later stage the prohibitions contained in the draft also to other military uses of the sea-bed. It was generally felt that such a commitment should be not only reflected in the preambular paragraphs but also clearly expressed in the operative part of the treaty, as was done in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). This has also been the view of the Polish delegation, and we shall continue to support the amendment of the Swedish delegation contained in document CCD/271.

20. As far as other aspects of that draft treaty are concerned, my delegation is aware of the reasons which have led to the inclusion in article I and article II of references to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.[1/] However, the Polish delegation understands the concern of those who expressed the fear that reference to another treaty might raise problems of a legal and a practical nature. We have to take into account the fact that a number of the countries which we hope would adhere to the sea-bed treaty might not have ratified the aforesaid 1958 Geneva Convention. We therefore see considerable merit in a clear stipulation of a twelve-mile delimitation in the treaty itself.

21. Finally, one of the controversial aspects of the draft lies in its verification provisions. In the course of our previous debate on this subject, it might be recalled, the Polish delegation was of the opinion that the provisions contained in article III would be technically sufficient (CCD/PV.444, paras. 33 et seq.). Serious concern was expressed, however, by a number of coastal States which believed that such verification might be prejudicial to their national sovereignty. A number of very important arguments were advanced and specific suggestions were formulated by the Canadian delegation (CCD/270). My delegation would favour the adoption of most of the modifications on this point. The debate on this subject in this Committee has demonstrated a large degree of mutual accommodation and compromise, and that is why we are confident that it will be possible to reach agreement on a draft treaty for the sea-bed in a relatively short time.

[1/] United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

22. The Polish delegation shares the view that there is an evident interrelationship and interaction among the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly. That underlines again the pressing necessity of solving one of the most important political issues facing the United Nations and having a direct bearing on disarmament negotiations. I am referring to the principle of universality. A speedy solution of that problem would add a significant element of realism to the over-all efforts aimed at general and complete disarmament.

23. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I should like now to speak in my capacity as head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic.

24. Allow me at the outset of my statement to welcome warmly to this Conference our new colleagues the representatives of Brazil, Japan, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland and Romania. I am certain that their contribution to our endeavours here will be as constructive as was that of their distinguished predecessors. I cordially welcome, too, the acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. William Epstein.

25. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is resuming once again its activities with, I trust, a renewed sense of hope and expectation. Though we are all encouraged by the steady improvement in the international climate in many parts of the world, we cannot but note with apprehension the constant deterioration which has marked the situation in the Middle East. Not only do solemn resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly remain unheeded, but also military might is indiscriminately used, making prospects of peace more remote than ever. The family of nations cannot afford to take a negative attitude in face of such threats to peace on the grounds that the world should become hardened by living dangerously. International organizations were not set up to entrench themselves in passive behaviour; for such a misleading philosophy more often than not leads to ever more harm — and that would not spare those who preferred to remain silent. Thus we meet at a time when the hopeful and encouraging signs in the international situation are blurred by the deep and threatening shadows forced upon our region.

26. The General Assembly at its last session reviewed, thoroughly and conscientiously, problems pertaining to disarmament. It has become more and more apparent that constructive deliberations on this all-important subject are not the privileged domain of a few but that many have the dedication as well as the ability to partake in them in a very positive manner. Having said that I should like, however, to warn of certain

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

pitfalls that may lie in our common path. Negotiations on disarmament should not be allowed to turn into an exercise whereby the so-called "haves" and "have-nots" bitterly confront each other. It is necessary, indeed imperative, that we all, nuclear and non-nuclear, advanced and developing countries, co-operate sincerely and effectively to achieve our common objectives.

27. The big Powers must recognize the legitimate interests in disarmament of the smaller Powers; on the other hand, the latter must have understanding for the delicate and complicated nature of our endeavours. Though the combined will and dedication of one and all to achieve success would be important, they would seem in our view not enough; for such co-operation would inevitably fail if not given clear and concrete means to sustain it. Such means, I submit, would lie in the strengthening of our Conference. That, let me hasten to add, has already been done where representativeness is concerned by inviting eight more countries, all highly qualified, to participate in our work. This enlargement has been endorsed by the General Assembly (resolution 2602 B (XXIV); CCD/275).

28. However, a mere increase in the membership of this Conference should not in itself be considered enough. The Conference must retain its nature as "the world's principal forum for multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament", as it was so rightly described by the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Smith (CCD/PV.449, para.12). Thus none of the disarmament issues with which the Conference is seized should be removed to be discussed outside this body unless there are very strong reasons for doing so. In such a rare case this body should be kept informed on the developments of that particular issue, which should at the earliest opportunity be brought back to the Conference.

29. All-important to the over-all standing of our Conference would also be an increase in its productivity. This could be achieved by an improved organization of our work and a better choice of subjects, which should complement each other in a balanced way so as to include matters of high priority together with the less urgent or less ripe issues of disarmament. Furthermore, we share the view that we should beware of allowing the purely technical aspects of our work to come before the political nature of the Conference. While we readily acknowledge the importance of the technical side of our work and the need for experts to advise us on complicated subject matters, we should not allow such an aspect to turn the Conference into a mainly technical body

at the expense of its principal character, which is and remains political. We must therefore always see to it that a proper balance between these traits — the political and the technical — is maintained, and not allow our efforts to become tied up by too technical matters.

30. A further source of strength for the Conference would lie in the establishment of closer links and the setting up of better co-ordination between this body and those bodies or organizations that are working on similar or connected subjects. I believe we can no longer afford to work in isolation one from the other, as we have done up to now.

31. Lastly, we feel that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament owes it to itself to ensure that the efficacy of those treaties that have been negotiated here is maintained at all times and, indeed, for ever. Since all here share responsibility for their inception, we also share the duty to ensure their survival.

32. In this context I should like to observe that the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) has been considerably reinforced recently. All the three nuclear Powers signatories thereto have now ratified it, and more of the technologically-advanced countries have decided to adhere. As evidence of the importance the United Arab Republic attaches to the Treaty, my country was among the first to sign it after having actively participated in the efforts that led to its successful conclusion. However, the fact that the aim of the Treaty, which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, has not found favour with a certain country in our region notorious for its repeated aggressions constitutes a clear threat to the Treaty itself, for if it is not to find full application in this highly inflammable region, that will undoubtedly endanger its implementation in other parts of the world too.

33. Parallel to the negotiations here, representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will soon meet again to continue their bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons. While Vienna is not to be construed as an alternative to or as a substitute for Geneva, we have to recognize that an interrelationship exists between the work on arms control to be pursued in both these cities, which is expected to generate a salutary reciprocal influence.

34. Thus this Conference could, by adopting a realistic and far-sighted attitude in its negotiations here, assist the two super-Powers in their endeavours to agree on a concrete solution to the problem of the strategic nuclear arms race. On the other hand, as these talks proceed — in a successful manner, we pray — they will undoubtedly create a climate of greater confidence between the two super-Powers. This in turn will have a beneficial effect on our work here by giving it the much-needed impetus which has been slow to come since the non-proliferation Treaty was opened for signature in 1968. In the meantime we hope that the two super-Powers remain alert to the dangers of baneful speculations which an excessively prolonged silence concerning their talks might produce.

35. In resolution 2499 A (XXIV)/Rev.1, operative paragraph 9 (CCD/275), the General Assembly endorsed the call of the Secretary-General, U Thant, for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade which will coincide with the Second United Nations Development Decade. General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), operative paragraph 1, declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. The same resolution, in operative paragraph 4, asks this Conference to -

> "... work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session." (ibid.)

36. Although my delegation voted for those resolutions, I should like to caution this Conference against allowing the declaration of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade to become a mere slogan to be brandished from time to time as the need arises. Though I know this to be far from the minds of all of us, I should like to remind the Conference that the call to proclaim a Disarmament Decade was prompted by the simple fact that this Conference did not live up to the expectations of the world at large. The results we were able to show for our endeavours were rather meagre; we failed to give attention to the problems of general and complete disarmament and we ignored some other vital issues, while concentrating our efforts on matters at least some of which were less urgent and less vital.

37. The leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Roshchin, frankly and truthfully stated at the beginning of our session that "in the field of disarmament there still has not

been any substantial progress" (CCD/PV.449, para.39). Mr. Smith, the leader of the United States delegation, observed too that "It is clear that we have not made as much progress as all of us had hoped" (ibid., para. 15). For this reason, and in order to be truly honest with ourselves here and with those who watch us closely from without, we must first of all study the possible content of such a decade as well as the means of its practical implementation. Experience has taught us that the enthusiasm at the beginning of such a decade could only too easily turn to disappointment at its end, when the hopes that were pinned on too sweeping an undertaking faltered and gave place to despair.

38. Stemming from this, my next comment concerns the comprehensive programme which is to form the pillar of the Disarmament Decade, and we ask, what is this programme meant to contain? Is it to be a tight and detailed plan of action comprising aims to be achieved, routes to be followed and target dates to be respected? Surely this could not be the view of the Conference, for there could be no surer way to lead ourselves and others into a very grave error. On the other hand, such a programme could not be a mere list of items pertaining to the cessation of the armaments race, disarmament or merely non-armament juxtaposed without sequence or interrelation. It would therefore seem to us that this programme should be founded on basic conceptions concerning the sequence and interrelation of the various issues confronting us.

39. However, we are fully aware of the many difficulties that we shall have to face. Ten years is indeed a very long period to organize in advance; and it is not an easy matter to set up priorities for so extended a term. Issues of disarmament proper might not all be necessarily the most urgent ones needing our consideration; and some collateral measures could at a certain stage outweigh the former in importance. However, importance and urgency alone are not the only criteria for setting up priorities; for we shall have to keep in mind our possibilities, the degree of maturity attained by the various issues; and the conditions prevailing on the international scene. In face of such difficulties we believe that our purpose would be served best by showing initiative, imagination and flexibility when probing together the conception of a comprehensive programme, while keeping in mind that too rigid programming would carry within its specifics the risk of setbacks and, indeed, of failure.

(The Chairman, United Arab Republic)

40. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his timely and valuable address to the Conference, reminded us that -

> "Elements of such a programme already exist in the two drafts of treaties for general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3), in the provisional agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) adopted by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in August 1968, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in September 1968 (A/7277, pp.6-7)" (CCD/PV.450, para.20)

My delegation is prepared to discuss in detail this particular issue as well as all suggestions that may be forthcoming in the days to come. We are eager to mark progress and, should ways and means be found to make progress more tangible, we would certainly be in favour of seeing them applied. Yet let us remember that the success of the Disarmament Decade is not dependent so much on the setting up of a comprehensive programme as on a new outlook on disarmament being adopted by all nations of the world without exception.

41. I do not wish to leave this issue without commenting briefly on its relationship to the Second United Nations Development Decade, with which it will coincide. Is it the intention that these two should proceed on a parallel though completely independent course, with no other affinity than that related to the beginning, the duration and the end of their term? Or is it intended that a certain link be established between the two? Many countries seek such a link in the sense that resources released by disarmament would be converted to peaceful needs, especially those of the developing countries. Such a link would find its basis in General Assembly resolution 1837 (XVII) entitled "Declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament".

42. First and foremost on our agenda is and remains the question of the suspension of underground nuclear tests. It is the most important as well as the most urgent of all the collateral measures awaiting a solution. As my delegation sees it, everything that need be said concerning this item has been said time and again in this Conference. It has received our most thorough attention over a prolonged period; and a great number of constructive proposals have been made with a view to helping us out of the impasse in which the Conference finds itself.

43. It has been suggested that the strategic arms limitation talks are very closely related to the test-ban issue. We do not in the least deny this relationship; yet we wish to point out that its nature does not seem to us to be of an absolute character, thus ruling out our interest in the subject or enjoining us to delay its consideration until success is assured in the bilateral talks. After all, this Conference considers this item in a much wider scope than that in which it might be raised in Vienna; and General Assembly resolution 2604 B (XXIV), in operative paragraph 3, requested this Conference "to continue as a matter of urgency" its deliberations on the subject and to submit a special report on their results at its next session. The Conference will remember, I am sure, that my delegation presented during 1965 a proposal with a view to achieving the cessation of all underground tests (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9 et seq.). This proposal has found and still finds a favourable echo; and my delegation will have more to say on this particular subject at a later stage.

44. Turning my attention now to the sea-bed issue, I believe that all of us here could agree that the discussions on this particular item during the last session of the General Assembly proved fruitful in the extreme. One can even go so far as to say that on many points of importance a certain consensus emerged. We shall have to take due account of these views, which should form our guideline in the forthcoming negotiations on the subject, which seems to us to be particularly ripe for agreement.

45. The Conference will recall that the detailed views of my delegation on the first joint draft treaty on the sea-bed tabled by the USSR and the United States of America (CCD/269) were put forward on 23 October of last year (CCD/PV.445, paras. 109 et seq). Owing to the shortage of time our two co-Chairmen were not able then to comment on these views; but they presented on 30 October -- that is, on the last day of the session -- a revised draft treaty (CCD/269/Rev.1) which was annexed to the report of the Conference (CCD/274, Annex A) and forwarded to the General Assembly without having been discussed here. It was then observed that, in spite of some substantial improvements, the concerns voiced in this Conference were reflected in that revised draft in only a limited way.

46. Since we do not as yet know the pattern which this Conference will decide to follow in deliberating on this issue, we would like at this stage to refer to our detailed statement (loc. cit.) which reflects my Government's position thereon, while reserving for ourselves the right to speak on the subject again whenever we deem it necessary.

47. The General Assembly, in resolution 2603 B (XXIV), requested our Conference to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the banning of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare. Part A of the same resolution gave a clear definition of these agents. On this particular item we have before us two draft conventions: one on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, co-sponsored by Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukraine and the Soviet Union (A/7655); the other on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted by the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1). We are furthermore aware of the discussions on this subject held during the last session of the General Assembly. We are thus confronted with a vast movement on this particular issue which we must seek to channel into one path acceptable to all.

48. My delegation has had the opportunity in the past to comment on the initiative of the United Kingdom, and I need not take up the time of the Committee by repeating our views. As regards the draft convention submitted by the nine socialist countries, we are gratified to note that it is comprehensive inasmuch as it deals with both chemical and biological weapons. This conforms to our basic position on the subject, which favours the treatment of these weapons simultaneously.

49. Thus, having these two draft conventions before it, this Conference must come to an agreement on the scope of the convention we are requested to negotiate. In doing so it will have to be inspired by the comments made here and in the General Assembly on this subject. This preliminary step is, to our mind, important, as it will assist us in focusing attention on a precise and delimited object instead of squandering and dispersing our energies and resources. In this connexion my delegation has noted with appreciation the constructive attitude of the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Chalfont, who assured us that his delegation is "ready to fall in with the wish of the majority" (CCD/PV.451, para.18).

50. I have paid attention so far to certain items only. This does not mean that other issues of arms control and disarmament do not arouse our interest or concern. In this respect I would like to mention in particular problems relating to general and complete disarmament which for quite some time have not been evoked and discussed in this Conference and to which we have to devote our keen attention. Thus we must

work hard in order to convince world public opinion of the seriousness with which we approach our task. The image of this Conference is at stake; and it rests solely with us to see to it that it remains bright and hopeful.

51. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I should like to say at the outset how greatly my delegation appreciated the presence among us at the beginning of this new session of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, who was kind enough to make to us on 18 February an important declaration (CCD/PV.450), the merit of which is that it launched the Disarmament Decade and recalled a number of urgent and vital tasks entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session (CCD/275). Having said this, I should like to submit certain comments of a general character affecting various features of the disarmament problem, while referring more particularly to the urgent and priority objectives which must be achieved in this field.

52. Since the publication in September 1961 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), little progress has been achieved in this field, which is both vital and of the utmost priority for the security and peace of the world. Despite the importance of certain measures adopted in the nuclear field, such as the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)), and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), a heavy task still remains to be accomplished. Unfortunately general and complete disarmament appears more and more to be an idealistic and distant objective. The race in all kinds of arms has not ceased its accelerated rate of development, and expenditure on arms breaks a new record every year. According to an inquiry reproduced in the UNESCO Courrier of January 1970, it will reach the astronomical figure of 4,000 million dollars during the next ten years -- the period corresponding to the Disarmament Decade.

53. Nuclear disarmament, which constitutes the major preoccupation of the international community, has not achieved any substantial progress. Mr. Smith of the United States said to us in his statement on 17 February that the sixties "saw a continuing refinement and deployment of nuclear weapons and extraordinary development of strategic delivery systems, both offensive and defensive" (CCD/PV.449, para.15). In the same field it should be noted that the underground tests of nuclear weapons have continued to create apprehension and disquiet in all countries of the world. Speaking at our

meeting on 18 February Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, recalled an aspect which seemed "particularly disturbing, namely that of radioactive leakages from underground nuclear explosions" (CCD/PV.450, para.42), of which a certain number -- nineteen according to the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (p.250) -- had taken place after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963.

54. The speakers who have preceded me have referred brilliantly to a certain number of resolutions and draft treaties or conventions before the Conference. They have stressed in a specific way the urgent tasks which the Conference is called upon to fulfil during the course of this first year of the Disarmament Decade. My delegation shares the view of all those who feel that an absolute priority should be given by the Committee on Disarmament to nuclear disarmament and to the progressive elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and bacteriological weapons, without losing sight of our final objective, which is general and complete disarmament. Within that framework we believe that the Conference should redouble its efforts in order to achieve, during this session, an agreement on the question of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

55. My delegation submitted during the last session a number of suggestions (CCD/PV.445, paras. 161-174) on the subject of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States (CCD/269/Rev.1). However, we are ready to contribute to a rapid achievement of an agreement on this important question. In any case, as Mr. Roshchin, the representative of the USSR, has said, "at the present time it is important to prevent the entry into force of the treaty from being delayed for reasons which have no direct bearing on the aims and purposes of the treaty" (CCD/PV.449, para.53). During the discussion on this very question of the sea-bed one sometimes had the impression that it was no longer a question of finding the means of halting the race in the field of weapons of mass destruction, but simply one of limiting the geographical scope and fixing the area within which those arms should be placed.

56. Another important question to which we should grant particular priority this year in our debates is that of chemical and biological agents, the use of which for military purposes would be an inhuman act and an atrocious crime that would lead deliberately and without forewarning to the destruction of all living matter in the world, while our civilization would lose all its moral values, its creative force and the whole reason for its existence.

(Mr. Khattabi, Morocco)

57. This vitally important question was considered with particular attention last year by the members of this Committee as a result of the submission by the Secretary-General of a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575), and by the United Kingdom of a draft convention (ENDC/255/Rev.1), which gave us a basis for discussion and evaluation. We now have before us another draft convention submitted at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly by the Governments of the nine socialist countries (A/7655).

58. At our meeting of 17 February Mr. Roshchin referred to that draft convention and recalled to us the point of view of his Government on the banning and elimination of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare (CCD/PV.449, paras. 41 et seq.). Before that Mr. Smith had expressed the point of view of his Government on this question and recalled the decisions announced last November by the President of the United States of America concerning both the objectives and the policy of his country in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons (ibid., paras.24 et seq.). At first glance it would appear that our task is not an easy one in view of the apparent divergence of views on this question. Nevertheless we may hope that a careful and attentive analysis of all opinions expressed and all the documents before us will lead us to the discovery of all possible approaches and then to rapid agreement on the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

59. The banning of underground nuclear tests is becoming a more and more urgent necessity. In the opinion of my delegation the achievement of an agreement on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests -- and I stress the word "comprehensive", which covers both the scope of the ban and all the countries possessing nuclear weapons -- would be an excellent beginning for the Disarmament Decade and would represent considerable progress in nuclear disarmament.

60. In his important statement made to this Conference, U Thant referred to the relationship between the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the banning of underground nuclear tests (CCD/PV.450, para.18). In the opinion of my delegation, that pertinent comment could mean two things: that agreement achieved within this Committee on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests would certainly contribute to progress in the Soviet-United States negotiations that have already had a good start in Helsinki. In this connexion I should like to say that we welcome

with considerable satisfaction, and with no less hope, the preliminary strategic discussions between the two great Powers which began in December last, and hope that those negotiations, when resumed next April, will result in an agreement to limit strategic arms and consequently in the cessation of the nuclear arms race in the near future.

61. Another aspect of the disarmament problem that has often been forgotten is that of conventional non-nuclear weapons. That problem was referred to recently by Mr. Smith (CCD/PV.449, paras. 35, 36), Mrs. Myrdal (CCD/PV.450, paras. 55, 56) and Lord Chalfont (CCD/PV.451, para. 15). The representative of the United States stressed quite clearly that "Measured in money, conventional weapons account for the major share of the world's military outlays and drain away resources critically needed for economic and social development" (CCD/PV.449, para. 35). The representative of Sweden referred to another aspect of this question linked to "the trade in Arms" -- to use her own expression -- and stressed that "Competition by the supplier countries is furthermore often increased by a desire to seek political influence among the customers." (CCD/PV.450, para. 56)

62. That comment by Mrs. Myrdal has revealed the special political aspect of this question, which hinders its consideration in this Committee. On the other hand, one cannot help thinking that this situation is largely due to the continuance of certain armed conflicts aggravated notably by obstinate maintenance of the military occupation of other people's territories and by refusal to implement the United Nations resolutions aimed at the re-establishment of law and peace. That being said, my delegation would favour the consideration by this Conference of certain aspects of a regional limitation of arms, within the context, of course, of general and complete disarmament and in the hope of a radical cessation of the armaments race.

63. After all those considerations I should now like to note and stress the importance of the Soviet proposal to resume work relating to general and complete disarmament without "any slackening of efforts to reach international agreements in the field of partial disarmament measures" (CCD/PV.449, para.59). That pertinent proposal made by Mr. Roshchin deserves our full consideration, all the more since it coincides with the proclamation of the Disarmament Decade. All

this points to the need to construct "a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV)). That programme, when drafted and approved, could become in some sort a universal declaration on disarmament which could enter into effect simultaneously with the Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations.

64. The conclusion is that we should consider the method of work of this Conference, and more particularly the proposals made by Mrs. Myrdal during her statement on 18 February with the aim of increasing the productivity of the Committee (CCD/PV.450, paras. 33 *et seq.*)

65. In this world of ours, marked by the growing degradation of man's natural milieu, by ever-increasing economic and monetary upheavals, by the challenge and revolt of the young in most of the developed countries, and by underdevelopment and the deep gulf dividing the countries of the third world from the economically-rich countries, the solution of the problem of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race become more than a necessity. Therein lies the importance of the task entrusted to this Committee, which has been called upon to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and consequently to the preservation of civilization, the fruit of thousands of years of effort and human solidarity.

66. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): I should like to introduce briefly the working paper on a comprehensive programme of work with a view particularly to disarmament which is submitted by my delegation today (CCD/276). My delegation was prompted to submit this paper in response to suggestions made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 18 February (CCD/PV.450, paras. 32 *et seq.*). On that occasion Mrs. Myrdal spoke of the necessity to increase the productivity of our Committee and to quicken its pace. One method to achieve this would be to avoid, to the extent possible, the reiteration of statements that have already been made, sometimes on several occasions, containing views which can therefore be regarded as well known.

67. The Netherlands delegation devoted part of its first statement in this Committee on 7 August 1969 (ENDC/PV.426, paras. 76-85) to the basic objective of the Committee, namely general and complete disarmament. It also dwelt on the Committee's programme

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

of work in the closing paragraphs of a statement made on 25 November 1969 during the general debate in the First Committee of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1699, provisional, p.36). We have therefore ventured to set out in greater detail the thoughts we expressed on those occasions and to present to this Committee a working paper containing some introductory remarks on steps towards a comprehensive disarmament programme.

68. In doing so we hope to make a modest contribution by drawing attention at an early stage of the current session to the broad facets which may have to be considered in connexion with the formulation of a comprehensive programme of work in the context of the Disarmament Decade. Of course, we have no intention of being presumptuous, and we realize that the list of topics covered in our paper is far from complete; nor do we, in raising certain questions, provide all the answers. It simply occurred to us that the preliminary results of our own mental exercise could perhaps serve some useful purpose if presented in the guise of a concise document.

69. I think I owe it to the Committee to make a brief survey of the contents of our working paper; but I shall not tax the patience of my colleagues for very long. The first four paragraphs are a recapitulation of past events and I shall not dwell on them. Paragraph 5 deals with the request to this Committee contained in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV). It is, in fact, the mandate given to us to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

70. In paragraph 6 we recall that the Committee was of the opinion that the balance ought to be maintained between various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. The following paragraphs deal with those three aspects of the question. As regards the first category, some measure of success has been achieved. As to the limitation of nuclear armaments, our paper stresses the importance of the strategic arms limitation talks which are now about to be resumed. At the same time it is suggested that efforts should be made in the meantime to further new agreements on other measures in the field of arms limitation.

71. There is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban. The Netherlands delegation is of the opinion, nevertheless, that early preparatory work for close international co-operation in the seismological field should

continue to receive high priority in this context. Therefore we attach great importance to the implementation and follow-up of the General Assembly resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data (2604 A (XXIV)). It also remains our opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee, as we pointed out during the meeting of 28 August 1969 (CCD/PV.432, paras. 52-54). Proposals to that effect were also made by other members of the Committee during our last session.

72. My delegation also feels that, pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation, new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. We think that during this session of the Committee the curtain could be raised on the Disarmament Decade by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

73. By way of interpolation, it occurs to me that the important problem of the establishment of nuclear-free zones is not explicitly mentioned in our working paper. I wish to reiterate my gratitude to the delegation of Mexico for the comprehensive documentation (CCD/268) which it put at the disposal of the Committee during our last session and which is attached to the Committee's last report to the General Assembly (CCD/274).

74. I should also like to recall that after due consideration the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which convened a few years ago in this very city, recommended in one of its resolutions the establishment of nuclear-free zones in areas where "political and security conditions permit" (A/7277, p.6). I think this restriction is still very pertinent and that it is for the countries of the region in question to decide themselves what course of action they wish to take in this respect.

75. Measures of non-armament and arms limitation would in our opinion not be limited to the nuclear field. In this connexion reference is made in our working paper to the question of chemical and biological warfare. We also think that, within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should be made to reduce and eliminate the conventional arms races. It would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures can only usefully start when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence-building has been sufficiently successful. This, however, does not exclude attention being devoted during the preparatory phase to the problems of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

76. If, as has been suggested, it is felt that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 1962 (ENDC/5) should be updated, then it is preferable, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation, that this be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of those principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1962 fully intact.

77. My delegation restates its view that measures of arms control and disarmament are closely linked with further developments and progress in the over-all political world situation; and in this connexion I should like to point out that the work of the Committee is therefore also interrelated with that of the Committee on friendly relations and of the Committee on peace-keeping.

78. In the closing paragraphs of the working paper we touch on the problem of possible studies on general and complete disarmament. Several alternative approaches are mentioned, which will undoubtedly be discussed more fully by the Committee.

79. The last paragraph contains the arguments for and the reaffirmation of our position that it would be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work for the next ten years or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to precise schedules and fixed time limits. Of course, this does not apply to the provisions of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, in which a certain sequence of measures to be carried out within specific periods of time is of the essence.

80. In conclusion, my delegation would like to assure the members of the Committee that it addresses its attention to the problem as a whole with an open mind. We shall be glad to benefit from the views of our colleagues on how the important task entrusted by the General Assembly to the Committee can best be accomplished. In this connexion I should like to say that my mind has been put at ease somewhat since I listened to the very wise remarks just made by the Chairman, who spoke on this subject with the full authority of one of the most senior and most experienced members of this Committee. I am encouraged, and I think it would not be amiss to say that our points of view in general did not seem too far apart and in some respects are almost identical.

81. Finally, I should like to revert briefly to Mrs. Myrdal's speech of 18 February. The representative of Sweden recommended that the practice of holding informal meetings occasionally should be continued during our current session (CCD/PV.450, para.35). I think this is a very valuable suggestion, particularly since we are about to tackle some new and highly complex problems. These may well be clarified by informal exchanges of views or the hearing of experts in informal sessions.

82. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In connexion with the fact that a number of delegations in the Committee have been interested in the outcome of the Soviet-United States technical talks on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which took place in mid-February in Moscow, we are now able to make known the text of a communiqué published at the end of last week in Moscow and Washington concerning the second stage of those talks, on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Permit me to read out this text of the communiqué:

> "On 12-17 February 1970 Soviet-American technical talks on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were held in Moscow. These talks were a continuation of technical talks on the same subject held in Vienna in April 1969. The Soviet delegation to the talks was led by the First Vice-Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, I.D. Morokhov. The American delegation to the talks was led by Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission T.J. Thompson.
>
> "During the talks the two sides discussed various aspects of possible peaceful applications of nuclear explosions and presented reports on experimental nuclear explosions.
>
> "The talks revealed a unanimity of views on the potentialities of using nuclear explosions for oil and gas field stimulation, for building underground cavities and water reservoirs in regions where required, for digging canals, for stripping overburden in open-cut mining operations, for dealing with emergency situations involving oil and gas wells and for other purposes.
>
> "Considerable attention was given to an exchange of views on safety aspects of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
>
> "Both delegations agreed that the exchange of views and information was very useful. They concluded that it would be desirable to continue such talks in the future. It was agreed that in the course of future talks it would be desirable to exchange research and engineering data obtained in the course of implementation of the national programmes. In this connexion special attention should be given to the safety aspects of conducting underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"Recognizing an important role to be played by the IAEA in the future in assisting the utilization of potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions by non-nuclear weapons countries, the two sides expressed their intention to promote appropriate scientific and technical studies within the framework of the IAEA and in the light of article V of the NPT which ensures that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to the non-nuclear-weapons States adhering to the Treaty."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 452nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador H. Khallaf, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, the Netherlands and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The delegation of the Netherlands submitted a working paper containing some introductory remarks on steps towards a comprehensive disarmament programme (CCD/276).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 26 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CCD/PV.453
26 February 1970
ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

GOVT
PUBLS
DEPT.

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 February 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:	Mr. I.F. PORTER	(United Kingdom)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. D. STAMBOLIEV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. TSUZUKI
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
Morocco:	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
	Mr. M.H. NASSAR
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN
	Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. **The CHAIRMAN** (United Kingdom): I declare open the 453rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (interpretation from French): The statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union at the beginning of this new session testify to the will of these two great nuclear Powers to pursue their efforts in order to reach positive results in the fields they indicated. Moreover, the composition of the Conference has been reinforced this year over that which existed at the beginning of the previous session by the presence of the new countries which joined us in July and August last. We then welcomed this enlargement, which gives the Committee a better-balanced geographical representation and reflects the polycentric nature of today's world. I am sure that the presence among us of the new members from Asia, Africa, South America and Europe will give greater force and scope to the work of the Conference, to the great benefit of the common effort.

3. This increase makes us regret all the more that France's place is still unoccupied. It seems to us, however, that present needs could give us hope for a change of attitude by the French Government.

4. The focal points of conflagration spread about the world are in fact always alight, and, despite the restraint and the efforts made by certain Powers to control them, the risk remains that at any moment a spark stronger than the others may set the powder alight. On the other hand, the simultaneous growth of military power in the world, due to technological progress and to the increase in expenditure on armament, makes this risk more and more terrifying. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (CCD/PV.450, para.10), the representative of the United States (CCD/PV.449, paras. 15, 35), and the representative of Mexico (ibid., paras. 95, 96), gave us at the beginning of this session of the Conference striking figures and details of the increase of military budgets in the world and of the shocking disproportion between the astronomical sums devoted to those budgets and those spent on certain activities vital to humanity. Other delegations during later meetings produced other figures and statistics which add to the picture of this paradoxical situation.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

5. For all these reasons I wish to address, in the name of the Italian Government, an appeal to the French Government to consider the possibility of resuming its place in this Conference at the side of the other member countries. I hope that France, which has never grudged its co-operation in work for peace, will no longer refuse to associate itself with the efforts of the other nuclear and non-nuclear countries represented at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. If criticisms can be made of the methods followed by our Conference and of the results it has obtained so far, it seems to us that the most effective way of remedying the insufficiencies which one deplores is actually to share within this Conference in its work and bring to it the valuable contribution of the specific qualities peculiar to each country.

6. On the resumption of its work in Geneva the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has before it a number of resolutions on disarmament voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations during its twenty-fourth session (CCD/275). These resolutions, as well as the debates which preceded them in the First Committee, testify to the great interest which the supreme organ of the United Nations accords to the problems which our Conference is to consider.

7. Simultaneously, the expectations of public opinion have been revived by the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms. The Italian Government, for its part, expresses its best wishes for the success of these talks, which are of great importance also for the subsequent development of the work of our Conference. After the phase of preliminary contacts in Helsinki, there will next be a more sustained phase of the Soviet-American conversations, which prompts the hope that the dialogue now begun may finally stop the nuclear arms race between the two great Powers and help the establishment between them of greater mutual confidence which will consolidate nuclear balance and peace in the world. We hope that these two almost parallel negotiations, between the members of this Conference and between the two great nuclear Powers, may as a result of a direct or indirect exchange of influences, rightly emphasized in the statement of the representative of the United States (CCD/449, paras. 18 et seq.), may exert increasingly beneficial effects on one another.

8. Throughout the last session the Italian delegation stressed the need to maintain a balance between the different measures of disarmament and the so-called collateral

measures, and pressed for the maintenance of an over-all view of the means suitable for reaching the final goal which is the reason for the creation and the very existence of this Conference.

9. The representative of Mexico recalled, in his statement on 17 February (ibid., para.69), that the three sources of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) were, first, the suggestion made by the delegation of Romania on 3 April 1969 (ENDC/PV.400, paras. 80-81), then the proposal in the Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General (A/7601/Add.1, paras. 42 et seq.), and thirdly the suggestion of the delegation of Italy contained in the working document of 21 April of last year (ENDC/245) and aimed at establishing an organic programme of disarmament. This resolution, approved by the General Assembly by a large majority, specifically requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament -

> "to work out, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

10. In the complex, confused and extremely dangerous situation which exists in the world today, our peoples must be given something which will help them to re-establish a certain degree of confidence, something which will prevent the disillusionment of the young and the despair of the old from becoming inordinate. In the field of disarmament nothing can better inspire that confidence, which is just as necessary for peoples as is faith in the heart of every man, than the hope of achieving within a reasonable time a situation whereby each nation, turning back on the road it had followed, will begin to reduce its military power by one soldier, by one artillery piece. The attention which the world's Press gave to the resumption of our work bears witness to the hopes which are placed in the work of this session which coincides with the beginning of the seventies.

11. The declaration of the Disarmament Decade by the General Assembly of the United Nations (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)), the importance and earnestness of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized by coming personally to Geneva and bringing us a message which was highly appreciated (CCD/PV.450), cannot be simply an exercise in pure rhetoric, for that would undermine the prestige that our Committee has been able to achieve in the opinion of the world and shake the confidence it inspires in other international organizations. Therefore the mountains must not give birth to a

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

mouse — parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus — but on the contrary, the declaration of the Disarmament Decade must achieve concrete significance. Towards this aim paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) seems to indicate to us a definite path.

12. Most of the speakers who have preceded me have advocated the urgent resumption of work for general and complete disarmament and have stressed the need to tackle the detailed programme requested by the United Nations. Consequently we are witnessing the existence in this respect of considerable agreement, which will probably grow as successive delegations make their general statements, and since in the past the expressed measure of agreement has underlain numerous decisions of our Committee, it cannot be denied proper consideration in the present case.

13. The problem facing us today is therefore to pass from the stage of general affirmations to that of concrete realization. It is a considerable problem and one whose solution will take a considerable time; its difficulties should not lead us to adopt an ostrich-like policy, but on the contrary to make a sustained effort to achieve possible solutions.

14. What has perhaps handicapped us so far has been the fear of becoming somewhat abstract in elaborating theories having little to do with political realities, and the other fear of ranging over an almost philosophical field and leaving aside the achievement of possible concrete measures. I am convinced that by taking those two dangers into account and by steering between Scylla and Charybdis we should be able to achieve a fairly flexible programme, to begin the consideration of various measures of disarmament in a fairly logical way, and to forecast realistically the possibility of achieving within a fairly reasonable time the beginning of the phase of effective disarmament.

15. I should like nevertheless to recall that the establishment of such a programme is more than the preparation of a simple priority list of the matters for consideration. The General Assembly resolution has stated that the programme should cover "all aspects" of the problem. The representative of Sweden in her statement of 18 February (CCD/PV.450), and the representative of the Netherlands in his very useful working paper of 24 February (CCD/276), which was accompanied by lucid and interesting explanations (CCD/PV.452, paras. 66 et seq.), have referred to some of them; but there are many others. We have a long and difficult operation before us, which requires a

pragmatic approach and, at the same time, imaginative efforts. This work must, in our opinion, start from a certain number of simple criteria round which it should be fairly easy to form a common opinion which would grow more and more substantial and finally become the object of negotiations and firm commitments by all countries. It is necessary above all to find the method of work most appropriate for achieving this grand design.

16. I should like in this connexion to say that, though the existence of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament presented in 1962 by the co-Chairmen (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) is certainly encouraging and may be a starting point for the new work of the Conference, we must carefully avoid those causes which in the past have brought the consideration of those plans to a halt. One of those causes was perhaps excessive optimism at the start. It was believed then that general and complete disarmament could be achieved through the negotiation of a single treaty. It was hoped that a single legal and political instrument could cover the implementation of linked phases until the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament was reached. The plans provided, moreover, that the process would begin directly with a reduction in arms and armed forces. That was perhaps not the only cause of the halt in negotiations on general and complete disarmament; but it is enough to induce us to resume consideration of the problem today with greater circumspection and to take all necessary precautions in order that the process may not be halted a second time.

17. I therefore think that, in order to follow up the United Nations resolution and formulate the programme which is requested of this Committee by the majority of public opinion, in this first phase of our session an intensive period should be provided for an exchange of views between all the delegations concerned in order to establish the quintessence of the problem, establish a certain convergence of view on the starting-points, and at the same time to reach a certain agreement on semantics. Certainly the setting-up of a working party to meet regularly would considerably facilitate the continuity of these exchanges of view without in any way affecting the negotiations in the full Committee on specific and collateral measures. I do not advocate this suggestion to the exclusion of all others. If the Conference believes that the setting-up of a working party open to all delegations concerned, which could in their turn enlist,

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

where necessary, the help of experts of their choice, would raise difficulties -- which I frankly confess I cannot see --, other less official means could equally well be sought, provided always that the exchanges of view between delegations could proceed without interruption.

18. I do not wish today to forecast too precisely the duration of this first phase of the exchanges of views, which I would term exploratory and which might roughly correspond to the first part of our session. Permit me, however, to insist on the need to establish now the moment for the start of the second phase, during which the Committee could begin to consider this important problem at its official plenary meetings. We believe that the date chosen for the discussion at plenary meetings of the Committee of the result of the preliminary exchanges of view must leave us sufficient time to accomplish useful work before the end of this session.

19. This leads me to make another remark, on procedure. If our Committee is to carry out during the present session all the work asked of it by the various United Nations resolutions, the discussion of the items must follow a specific order and not merely develop haphazard. I should therefore like to submit a suggestion to the co-Chairmen: that once the general statements have been concluded, the debate on the various items -- among which I include, of course, general and complete disarmament -- should be arranged in advance according to an approximate time-table so that each delegation can concentrate with the greatest efficiency on each item as it is discussed in its turn. It would be most regrettable if, owing to lack of effort and imagination or because of a general fear of the difficulties, which could probably be overcome more easily than seemed possible at first sight, the Committee were to miss the opportunity of playing the part the whole world expects of it.

20. The stress put on this over-all view of our problems in no way decreases the interest of the Italian delegation in the pursuit of discussions and negotiations on several specific problems before us. In proposing a particular method for the study of a more general and particularly complex problem, we do not wish to distract the attention of the Committee for a single instant from the current negotiations, which we wish to pursue simultaneously.

21. In particular, to begin with collateral nuclear measures, we very much hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can arrive as quickly as possible at an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on prohibition of the production of

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

fissionable material for military purposes. An agreement banning the production of fissionable material for military purposes, signed by the Powers possessing nuclear weapons, would balance and reinforce the commitment accepted by the non-nuclear Powers under the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), namely not to construct nuclear arms or other explosives with the fissionable material they possess for peaceful purposes.

22. We know that the non-proliferation Treaty constitutes the first bastion against the pursuit of the nuclear arms race because it seeks to prevent either an unlimited increase in the nuclear arsenals existing in the world through horizontal proliferation or an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. But for that aim to be achieved it is not enough for the Treaty to come into force as soon as possible, which is our ardent hope. It is necessary also to implement the policy which inspires the Treaty and with which the Italian Government co-operates wholeheartedly. That policy goes beyond the commitments laid down in articles I and II of the Treaty and also implies the duty to ensure the conditions necessary fully to justify the choice made by the States not possessing nuclear weapons.

23. The success of the policy of non-proliferation therefore depends to a large extent on the achievement of the other objectives set out in articles IV, V and VI of the Treaty, especially increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connexion we have noted with interest the communiqué of the co-Chairmen on the recent conversations in Moscow, and the beginning of new disarmament negotiations of wider scope. In this latter field new negotiations aimed at extending to all States the restrictions that the non-proliferation Treaty imposes on a single category of States ought to begin as soon as possible; only thus can the disequilibrium resulting from the Treaty be remedied and at the same time the policy of non-proliferation be made permanently irreversible by linking it to the process of halting the armaments race and reducing military arsenals.

24. But whereas the cessation of the arms race represents the primary objective of the non-proliferation Treaty, it is necessary at the same time to prevent the emplacement of nuclear arms in other media. That is why we have today, at the head of our work programme, the draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear arms and other arms of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.1). That draft treaty has as precedents the Treaty on the denuclearization of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)) and the

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

Antarctic Treaty[1]. We sincerely hope that the negotiations based on the draft submitted by the two co-Chairmen, which have already advanced so favourably, may soon lead to a satisfactory agreement.

25. I should now like to refer briefly to another item which will still be a subject of negotiation within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at the present session: the problem of banning and, if possible, destroying chemical and biological arms, concerning which two separate draft conventions (ENDC/255/Rev.1, A/7655) have been submitted.

26. The work of the Conference in this field has been encouraged and stimulated by the recent announcement of President Nixon that the United States has unilaterally renounced the production and use of toxins. This decision is all the more significant because it follows another decision on the more general subject of the use of biological weapons, also announced by President Nixon on 25 November 1969.

27. The Italian delegation followed with attention and interest, during the work of our Conference last year, the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation for the banning of biological means of warfare. We have always been in favour of the main objectives of the United Kingdom proposals, but we still had some doubts of the effectiveness of certain provisions of these, and expressed them at the unofficial meeting held on 30 July 1969. Most of them have since been removed by the clarifications provided by the United Kingdom delegation and the studies carried out by our competent services. I am very happy, therefore, to be able today to support the British initiative.

28. Nevertheless, I should like at the same time to recall the position adopted by the Italian delegation at the United Nations General Assembly in favour of a reinforcement of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p. 117), which we continue to consider a basic instrument in this field. We believe that, to extend the geographical scope of that Protocol and make it more universal, the States parties to the Treaty could make an effective gesture by withdrawing their earlier reservations of the right to use arms banned by the Protocol against non-signatory States, where these have not themselves violated the provisions of the Protocol.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, p. 71.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

29. Lastly, I should like to express the opinion that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might well follow in the preparation of its future work the example set by the Latin-American States when they adopted the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186) denuclearizing their continent. That Treaty could provide a model for the creation of other nuclear-free zones, not in outer space or under the seas and oceans but in those parts of the world where the necessary conditions existed.

30. In conclusion, the considerations I have put forward and the suggestions I have made in this statement, in which I have been able to deal with only a small part of the problems which concern us, are dictated by the conviction that this year more than ever the task before our Conference presents, by its very complexity, a challenge which we must at all costs take up. If it is true that the survival of nations depends on the answer that they give to the challenges of history at every turn, then the vigour and the vitality of organizations such as ours will undoubtedly be judged by the way they have stood up to the needs of the hour.

31. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): In my intervention of 17 February I took the liberty of analysing four of the questions referred to the Committee which, for the reasons that I then explained, appeared to us to deserve attention in priority (CCD/PV.449, paras.67 et seq.)

32. I should like today to deal very briefly with another question which also appears on our programme of work, namely that of nuclear-free zones. The establishment of such zones is undoubtedly an effective measure of nuclear disarmament. It necessarily implies, in fact, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in the territories of all States parties to the treaty under which the zone is established. The reason why I did not include this question in the summary review I gave in my earlier intervention was not that I do not attach sufficient importance to it, but rather that for the creation of any such zone, as is well known, the consent of States whose territories will be encompassed in the zone is an essential prerequisite. This situation has unfortunately not yet arisen except in Latin America, as the representative of Sweden pointed out last week (CCD/PV.450, para.48) in terms for the generosity of which, as a national of one of the countries in that part of the new continent, I wish to express my thanks. I likewise express our thanks to the representative of Italy, who also has just commended the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186).

33. That is why, in dealing with this question, I think I ought to confine myself to considering some of the more pertinent aspects of the only nuclear-free zone which exists in territories densely populated by man -- that is, the nuclear-free zone established by the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

34. In this connexion, and to supplement the information provided by my delegation at the meetings of the Committee held on 3 July (ENDC/PV.416, paras.47-49) and 9 September (CCD/PV.435) of last year and in the working paper CCD/268 of 15 September 1969, I should like to add that both the Final Act of the preliminary meeting for the constitution of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (REOPANAL) and a collection of all the resolutions adopted at the first part of the first session of the General Conference of that organization (OPANAL) have been reproduced as documents of the General Assembly of the United Nations bearing the symbols A/7639 of 28 August 1969 and A/7681 of 23 September 1969, which will facilitate consultation of them in any of the official languages of the Organization.

35. I should like also to inform the members of the Committee that the number of States parties to the Treaty -- which are automatically members of OPANAL -- has grown to fifteen, Guatemala having joined on 6 February of this year the fourteen States listed in the two documents I have just mentioned which had already deposited their instruments of ratification and declarations of total waiver of requirements under article 28 of the Treaty.

36. Lastly, it is also desirable to point out that the United Kingdom, the Government of which deposited on 11 December 1969 its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, has become the first nuclear-weapon State party to the Protocol. I would add that on the same date the United Kingdom became party to Additional Protocol I. I would not wish to let this opportunity pass without reiterating to the representative of the United Kingdom the great appreciation of the Government of my country -- which I have already had the opportunity to express in the First Committee of the General Assembly and which I am sure also reflects the sentiments of the other States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- of this new gesture designed to facilitate the achievement of the noble aims of the Treaty.

37. Similarly, we feel that this is the moment to recall that ratification of Additional Protocol II, to which I have just referred, has been the subject of two resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of one of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In this last resolution, resolution B, the Conference laid particular stress on its conviction that "for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary", and moreover stressed that this "co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol" (A/7277, p.5). In the three resolutions of which I have been speaking -- the other two being General Assembly resolutions 2286 (XXII) and 2456 B (XXIII)-- the nuclear-weapon Powers were urged in almost identical terms "to sign and ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco".

38. Furthermore the General Assembly, in its resolution 2499 A (XXIV)/Rev.1 adopted during its last session on 31 October and entitled "Celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations", agreed to address an appeal --

> "... to all Member States to give urgent consideration to the ratification of, or accession to, a number of multilateral instruments which have been adopted, endorsed or supported by the United Nations".

In this connexion it should be noted that among the antecedents of this resolution is the list transmitted by the Secretary-General to States Members in document A/7712, in section III of which is included under item 3 Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

39. Let us hope that the nuclear Powers which have not yet done so -- and which unfortunately are in a majority, since Additional Protocol II has been ratified by only one of them, the United Kingdom, as I informed the Committee a few moments ago, and signed by only one more, the United States -- will decide to heed the appeal of the General Assembly which I have just mentioned and which strengthens its many earlier exhortations.

40. Many reasons could be adduced in favour of the nuclear Powers making without delay the contribution once again requested of them by the body authorized to represent the international community. Among these reasons I will select the following by way of example:

41. First, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco there already exists today in the world a nuclear-free zone embracing territories covering an area of about six million square kilometres and containing a population of about one hundred million, both of which will grow as the number of States parties to the Treaty increases.

42. Second, on 2 September 1969 there was established in the City of Mexico the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), at a solemn ceremony which the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, honoured with his presence and at which he said among other things that in a world which often seems dark and ominous the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine like a beacon; that it surpasses in the scope of its prohibitions and provisions for control the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*), and that the creation of the zone is fully in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

43. Third, the obligations that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty entails for the nuclear Powers are in substance no more than the application to a specific or concrete case of the obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter, since they are limited to an undertaking to respect "the status of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes" and "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty" (ENDC/186, p.32).

44. The fourth and last example I want to give is this. Three years have already elapsed since both the Treaty and its Additional Protocols were opened for signature on 14 February 1967. Of course we realize only too well that this situation is like that of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, concerning which I said in my statement of 17 February that the Committee as such could apparently not intervene, at least for the present (CCD/PV.449, para.87). However, as in that case and for the same reasons, we believe that the other members of the Committee are in duty bound to state their opinions on this question and to urge the nuclear Powers which are members of our negotiating body to delay no longer compliance with the appeals repeatedly addressed to them by the General Assembly in its resolutions.

45. My delegation is convinced that all the resolutions of the General Assembly command equal respect and that it is not logical, much less legally justifiable, for each delegation to choose arbitrarily to cite for the purpose of our debates those resolutions that suit its own views while feeling free to disregard all the others.

46. In conclusion, I should like to announce to the members of the Committee that we shall shortly be handing to the Secretariat a brief addendum bringing up to date the working paper entitled "Establishment of nuclear-free zones" submitted by us last year and reproduced as document ENDC/241 of 24 March 1969.

47. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I should like to take this opportunity of my first statement of this session to extend a welcome to this friendly forum on behalf of the Canadian delegation to those representatives who have joined us for the first time: Ambassador Guerreiro of Brazil, Ambassador Abe of Japan, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, Ambassador El Fassi of Morocco, Ambassador Natorf of Poland and Ambassador Datcu of Romania.

48. I wish also to associate the thanks of the Canadian delegation with earlier expressions of appreciation for the continuation of the excellent services provided by the Secretary-General, his representative Mr. Epstein, and the United Nations Secretariat.

49. I shall follow the example of most of my colleagues who have preceded me in this general discussion by confining my remarks at this stage to some considerations of a general character. The message presented by the Secretary-General reminded us of the hopes and concerns of mankind as we enter a new decade. He gave clear expression to that state of anxiety and concern about some of the implications of the arms race and of rapidly-advancing technology which was so evident in the debates of the General Assembly recently concluded, to which others of my colleagues who have spoken have also made reference. Anxiety and concern are inevitable in an anxious world; but we realize here that it is our urgent task to try to turn that anxiety and concern to constructive use, as motivation for our patient and unflagging efforts to reach effective and equitable agreements. The Secretary-General gave us a great deal to think about; and I am sure that we shall have occasion to refer to his remarks during the course of our discussions this year.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

50. It was, moreover, particularly appropriate that the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly designated the 1970s the Disarmament Decade. We welcome the establishment of this decade for the emphasis it lays on the importance of our work in the field of arms control and disarmament, and for the incentive it gives us to achieve progress in the ten years which lie ahead. We should not, however, wish to see the idealistic concept of the Disarmament Decade, which is intended, as the Secretary-General reminded us, to accelerate our efforts, used in a manner which would result in the Committee's being bogged down in a discussion of priorities; for those, as the representative of the United Arab Republic and other colleagues reminded us at the 452nd meeting, are already reasonably clear and well established for the immediate future. It remains for us in the Committee to show progress in the fulfilment of the specific tasks which have been set by the United Nations General Assembly and in previous discussions of this Conference.

51. Surely there can be no doubt that progress on arms control and disarmament, in the interests of world peace, the conservation of man's environment and the need to be fully in control of the spreading ill-effects of technology are the three great issues facing us in the seventies. Progress on all three must be achieved if mankind is to avoid paying heavy penalties by the time we reach the eighties. Certainly the Canadian Government has recognized the issues which face us and attaches an overriding importance to the work of this Committee. As Prime Minister Trudeau stated in the House of Commons last October: "No single international activity rates higher in the opinion of this Government than the pursuit of effective arms control and arms limitation agreements."

52. However, the sombre fact is, as previous speakers also have underlined, that despite the continuing efforts made here and in New York the world rate of expenditure for military purposes remains staggeringly high. Indeed, as recent studies alluded to by previous speakers have suggested, if the present escalation continues the prospect is that the outlay of resources on arms will multiply in the next ten years with no apparent increase in national or international security.

53. Canada, as a neighbour of the United States and the Soviet Union, which outpace all other nations in the arms race, has particular reasons to be aware of the implications of that dangerous trend. Right now we are most concerned that, with

the new development of the multiple warhead missile, mutual suspicions of preparations for military supremacy by one side or the other will tend to increase, with the result that the problems of controlling the strategic arms race will tend to increase also.

54. Canada therefore welcomed wholeheartedly the beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks last November, and earnestly hopes that those talks will eventually be successful in achieving agreements which will signal to a waiting world the first evidence of a possible slowing-down of the nuclear arms race. This is, then, a time when efforts to curb the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons need to be redoubled. The opportunities have been enhanced through the initiation of the strategic arms limitation talks, and will be further increased if, as we very much hope will be the case, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) is brought into force in the near future. Once let slip, however, these opportunities may not again be easily recaptured.

55. In the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, we note that since we last met several steps have been taken towards bringing it into force. The ratification processes in the United States and the Soviet Union need only the formality of deposition of the instruments of ratification to be completed. Equally important, we welcome the ratification of the Treaty by Sweden, its signature by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, and the decision to sign by Australia, swelling the numbers of near-nuclear Powers adhering to the Treaty, whose support of the Treaty will largely decide how effective a measure it will be.

56. On the comprehensive test ban, the Canadian delegation is hopeful that, depending on progress over the next few months in the strategic arms limitation talks, it would be useful for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in its summer or autumn session, to take up the question of the comprehensive test ban, which we have consistently maintained is inevitably closely related to the strategic arms limitation talks, since continued underground testing is an outward symptom of the continuing escalation of the race for strategic weapons.

57. We hope that at that time the responses to the widely-supported General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV) on the question of an international seismic exchange will be available and that it will then be possible to follow this up. The responses which are received and the degree of collaboration they indicate will, in our view, be directly relevant to the further examination by the Conference of the Committee on

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

Disarmament of a possible comprehensive test ban, as well as bearing on the possibilities offered by the various threshold concepts which have been put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly.

58. In addition to the comprehensive test ban, a further desirable concomitant to progress in the strategic arms limitation talks will be the negotiation of a "cut-off" agreement. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty will underline the imperative requirement for a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The non-proliferation Treaty, in fact, discriminates between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the imposition of safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and that feature has been the basis of some of the criticism of the Treaty. A cut-off agreement involving acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States of safeguards on all their nuclear activities similar to those which other States are called upon to accept would remove that anomaly, greatly enhance the value of the non-proliferation Treaty, and be a real contribution towards creating confidence in the restraint of all concerned.

59. In the meantime it is the view of the Canadian delegation that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should devote itself in the immediate future to completing the sea-bed arms-control treaty, and to the question of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons of warfare from the arsenals of nations. Progress in those two fields would represent a full agenda; in addition, the last General Assembly has given us further encouragement to proceed with this work and specific mandates in areas where it particularly wishes to see progress achieved.

60. With regard to the sea-bed treaty the Canadian position on the substance is already on record (CCD/270). We think it desirable to move now to consolidate and proceed forward from the substantial area of agreement which has been achieved and to complete our consideration of the treaty in time, not only for the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, but also if possible before the summer meeting of the sea-bed Committee in Geneva, so as to reduce the risk of reopening the arguments concerned with the relationship of the draft treaty to the broader questions involved in preserving the uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor for peaceful purposes which occupied so much of the time of the General Assembly at its recent session.

61. The Canadian delegation is hopeful that, after the useful discussions on the subject of the prohibition of chemical and biological warfare last year both in this forum and at the United Nations General Assembly, progress is now possible in response to resolution 2603 B (XXIV). I can pledge the fullest co-operation of my delegation in negotiations this year on banning those terrible weapons. Canada strongly supports the draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1) submitted to this Committee by the United Kingdom delegation. At the same time we consider we should attempt to proceed as well with the consideration of parallel proposals on chemical warfare. To this end we particularly welcome the pledge made at the General Assembly by my British colleague Lord Chalfont, and repeated to this Committee, of the fullest co-operation of the United Kingdom delegation in efforts to develop proposals banning chemical warfare and at the same time to elaborate a convention on the prohibition of biological warfare (CCD/PV.451, para.18). We think the discussions last year on that subject have laid a firm foundation on which we can now move forward.

62. In conclusion, as I have said, the Committee has a full agenda. The last session of the General Assembly has given us further encouragement to proceed with our work, and specific mandates in areas where it particularly wishes to see progress achieved. The Canadian delegation will devote maximum effort to achieving maximum results at this session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 453rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador I.F. Porter, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Mexico and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 March 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.